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Executive Summary
This  synthesis report  sums up the findings of  the three year  long
research project:  Enablement besides  Constraints:  Human Security
and a  Cyber Multi-Disciplinary Framework in the European High
North (ECoHuCy).  The  aim  of  the  project  was  to  design  a
multidisciplinary  research  framework  to  address  human  security
questions related to digitalisation and the increasing importance of
cybersecurity. It re-conceptualises cybersecurity by shifting the focus
from  technical  infrastructure  to  safeguarding  human  wellbeing.
Digitalisation affects the population of regions differently, depending
on  the  regional  peculiarities.  This  project  focused  on  the
northernmost areas of Finland, Norway and Sweden – the European
High North.
Key Findings
A human security perspective on cybersecurity
• Current cybersecurity frameworks are state-centric and 
focus on securing information and information 
infrastructure. They aim to safeguard the benefits of 
digitalisation at the national level.
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• Current cybersecurity frameworks fail to acknowledge that 
digitalisation may create new insecurities for people in their
everyday life and lack to address the impacts of 
digitalisation in region-specific contexts.
• Utilising human security approaches can supplement 
current cybersecurity understanding and make it more 
inclusive to people’s interests and concerns.
• A human-centred cybersecurity approach can be used to 
address the issues and challenges people experience from 
digitalisation in everyday life and in region-specific 
contexts. It can therefore be used as a policy-making tool to 
advance human wellbeing.
Citizen and civil society perspectives on cyberspace
• Cyberspace has not profoundly changed society in terms of 
the relative power that one type of civil society has over 
another type of civil society. Our framework for analysis 
further illustrates this finding. Basic norms, culture, 
interests, and goals of civil society organizations have not 
significantly been changed.
• Digitalisation has had a transformative, generally positive 
impact in the way communication happens, internally and 
externally, between local communities, authorities and civil 
society organizations in northern Norway. It has particularly
helped to overcome past constraints linked to geographical 
distance or remoteness.
• Transnational contacts and cooperation between civil 
society organizations in the EHN were fostered, made 
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possible and enhanced by the emergence of cyberspace and 
digitalization.
• At the citizen and civil society level, our findings identified 
that citizens experience everyday cyber insecurity and wish 
for more effective ways to reduce or prevent the dangers 
inherent to it. Concerns particularly associated to personal 
information security, democracy and critical infrastructure 
emerged as important matters deserving attention.
• Community-wise, our findings call attention to the need for 
creating strategies to reduce and prevent the negative effects
of digitalisation in local communities. Our case study in 
Lofoten illustrates that these negative effects can 
significantly alter the nature, environment and local 
economy. Thus, diverse communal strategies that take into 
account the voice of different stakeholders are suggested to 
minimize the negative impact and enhance the positive 
changes brought by digitalisation. 
ICT access and use among elderly people
• Many people think digitalisation especially benefits 
peripheral areas such as the EHN. The internet has been 
described as an equaliser, and participants provided a 
number of examples of how digital technologies enable 
them to live, study and work in the EHN.
• Participants distinguished between different types of ICT 
use. For example, they pointed out that many elderly can 
competently use social media platforms like Facebook 
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while lacking the skills and knowledge to use services such 
as online banking.
• Younger family members are an important resource to many
elderly people when using digital technologies. Sometimes, 
this involves a younger family member buying and setting 
up equipment. Other times, this goes as far as the older 
family member ‘relinquishing’ control over their own 
finances so that a family member can access online banking
on their behalf.
• Full accessibility for people with disabilities, especially 
visual impairments, is still a challenge. Providing services 
in Sámi languages has also been under-prioritised.
Climate change, environmental threats and cybersecurity
• There is an important linkage between environmental 
governance and cybersecurity of CIs in the energy sector in 
the EHN, which has prompted legal scholars and 
policymakers to rethink their agenda based on 
reconceptualisation as well as a shift to sustainable 
cybersecurity incorporating the notion of human security.
• Cyberattacks to CIs in the EHN are sometimes subject to 
environmental threats due to climatic conditions as a 
consequence of climate change, which warrants labelling 
them exceptionally critical infrastructure conditions 
(ECICs), which require both an ad hoc and stronger 
regulatory frameworks.
• Because ECICs are present in the EHN, digitalisation must 
be viewed as a mean to achieving economic and social 
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development and increasing environmental protection. 
Likewise, protection against cyberthreats must ensure the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
• In the EHN, there is a need for future agreements applicable
to CIs and cybersecurity that link environmental 
governance and resilience to cybersecurity and incorporate 
the notion of human security. This can be designed by 
combining different sources of law and policy from 
international, regional and domestic levels.
• Many aspects of the cybersecurity regime are highly 
fragmented, resulting in gaps in international law and 
policy, which is why drawing a parallel between the 
environmental (liability) regime and the nascent 
cybersecurity regime in a global-local approach is important
in order to identify ways to improve the cybersecurity 
regime in the EHN.
The results of this research project suggest that by utilising a human
security  approach  the  cybersecurity  framework  becomes  more
comprehensive.  Instead  of  focusing  on  technical  infrastructure,  a
comprehensive  cybersecurity  approach  focuses  on  safeguarding
human wellbeing. Such a human-centred cybersecurity approach can
be  applied  as  a  tool  in  order  to  create  meaningful  and  targeted
policies  that  address  both  the  positive  and  negative  impacts  of
digitalisation,  while  at  the  same  time  allowing  the  flexibility  to
consider regional peculiarities.
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Preface
The completion of this book is an outcome of the research that was
conducted  as  part  of  the  three-year-long  international  research
project:  Enablement  besides  Constraints:  Human  Security  and  a
Cyber Multi-Disciplinary Framework in the European High North
(ECoHuCy). The project is a part of the “society, integrity and cyber-
security” theme of the Nordic Societal Security Programme run by
NordForsk – an organisation under the Nordic Council of Ministers
that promotes Nordic cooperation on research and its infrastructure.
The project was hosted at the Northern Institute for Environmental
and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland (Rovaniemi,
Finland). Project partners were the University of Tromsø – the Arctic
University of Norway, Swansea University (United Kingdom) and
the  Institute  for  Security  and  Development  Policy  (Sweden).  The
project was carried out from January 2017 to December 2019. This
book represents a synthesis report of the research conducted during
the project.  As some of the empirical  research work is still  being
analysed, and some outcomes have not yet been published, parts of
the book  contain preliminary findings or refer to  articles or books
that will be published soon.
Gerald Zojer
December 2019
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 1 Introduction
Gerald Zojer
Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
In the 21st century, the concept of cybersecurity has risen on the agendas of
state  administrations,  (trans/inter)national  organisations  and  corporations.
This is due to rapidly advancing digitalisation, which is the process of the
digital transformation of our societies. Business, public administration and
societal functions are increasingly handled through digital technologies and
information  and  communication  technologies  (ICTs),  which  are
interconnected in cyberspace. At the same time, the process of digitalisation
has advanced to an extent that a functioning society has become dependent
on  undisrupted  cyberspace  and  ICTs.  However,  digital  technologies  are
vulnerable, and technical failures, connectivity problems, human abuse or
error can cause interruption of services. In order to address such challenges,
information security and cybersecurity frameworks have been developed.
When the infrastructure of an entire society is threatened, the question of
security shifts from the individual or organisational level to the state level.
Consequently,  most  countries  have  developed  cybersecurity  strategies  to
safeguard  their  cyber  infrastructure.  The  concept  of  cybersecurity  has
remarkable  visibility  in  contemporary  security  literature.  Much  of  it
addresses  negative  security:  threats  to  be  mitigated  by  applying  specific
measures,  such  as  to  protect  critical  infrastructure  from  cybercrime,
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cyberwarfare,  hacktivism  or  espionage.  At  the  individual  level,
cybersecurity deals with data protection or privacy. However, the everyday
life experiences of individuals or communities interacting with digitalisation
also leads to new insecurities and challenges, such as the creation of social
exclusion, disappearance of physical services or impacts on local culture.
Mainstream  approaches  to  cybersecurity  fail  to  address  these  security
challenges at  the individual  or community level.  Moreover,  they tend to
treat society at the national level somewhat homogeneously, ignoring the
differences and peculiarities between regions within states.
The impacts of digitalisation can also be observed in the northernmost parts
of  Finland  (Lapland),  Norway  (Troms  and  Finnmark)  and  Sweden
(Norbotten)  –  or  the  European  High  North  (EHN).  In  the  European
Commission’s 2019 Digital Economic and Society Index, Finland, Norway
and Sweden ranked in the top five performing countries. However, the way
digitalisation impacts societal development differs depending on the region.
The socio-economic and environmental peculiarities of the EHN makes the
region distinct from the more southern parts of these countries. The EHN is
a  peripheral  region  with  a  low  population  density,  less  developed
infrastructure and harsh climate with long and dark winters, and in the rural
areas  especially,  it  is  shaped  by  traditional  economic  activities,  such  as
reindeer herding or fishing. Moreover, the EHN is also the homeland of the
Sámi, an Indigenous people consisting of several small  language groups.
These  particularities  create  a  set  of  features  that  make  the  impact  of
digitalisation in the region distinct.
This book represents a synthesis of the work conducted within the three-
year research project Enablement besides Constraints: Human Security and
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a  Cyber  Multi-Disciplinary  Framework  in  the  European  High  North
(ECoHuCy).  The  aim  was  to  design  a  multidisciplinary,  comparative
research  framework  to  address  human  security  questions  related  to  the
dis-/integrating effects  of  digitalisation and  the  increasing  importance  of
cybersecurity.  It  constructs  a  research  agenda suited  for  the  purposes  of
policy makers, regulators and academia alike, as well as giving the citizens
and communities of the EHN a voice in matters related to cybersecurity. It
questions  the  mainstream conceptualisation  of  cybersecurity  and  instead
reconstructs it with the human as the referent object of security. By utilising
the  human  security  concept,  the  project  establishes  a  human-centred
cybersecurity framework. This theoretical work has been accompanied and
supported by several empirical case studies.
In order to develop this novel framework, the project work was divided into
four  substantial  work  packages.  This  book  summarises  these  work
packages,  with each chapter representing the results of one project  work
package. It is worth noting that due to the interdisciplinary approach to the
overarching theme, many deliverables of the project fit into more than one
work package.
Chapter  2,  ‘Theorizing  Security:  Human  Security  Perspective  on  Cyber
Security’, summarises the theoretical framework that was developed during
the  project.  It  concentrates  on  the  theoretical  development  of  a  human
security  perspective  on  cybersecurity.  It  begins  with  an  analysis  of  the
national cybersecurity discourse as established in the countries of the EHN.
Then, it discusses the commonalities and shortcomings of these strategies,
before elaborating the human security discourse and how it  is  related to
digitalisation in the EHN. The chapter closes with a deconstruction of the
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mainstream  cybersecurity  discourse  and  presents  a  human-centred
cybersecurity perspective based on the human security concept.
Chapter 3,  ‘Citizen and Civil  Society Perspectives on Cyberspace in the
European High North’, draws attention to the effects cyberspace and ICTs
have on citizens in the EHN, with a particular focus on Northern Norway. It
brings forth empirical evidence of the benefits and constraints arising from
digitalisation  for  non-profit  civil  society  organisations.  It  suggests  that
digitalisation  has  significant  impacts  on  civil  society,  but  that  it  neither
enhances nor constrains civil society.
Chapter 4, ‘ICT Access and Use Among Elderly People in the European
High North’, presents empirical findings on how digitalisation and access to
ICTs affects elderly people in the EHN. It shows the dichotomy of how
digitalisation  can  increase  access  to  services  for  some  but  create  new
accessibility challenges for other community members, for example, due to
a lack of digital skills, physical impairments or absence of services in local
languages. The chapter furthermore discusses how younger family members
have become an important resource for elderly members when using digital
services.
Chapter 5, ‘Climate Change, Environmental Threats and Cybersecurity in
the European High North’, establishes the interconnection between global
environmental  governance  and  cybersecurity  as  well  as  between  the
environmental liability regime and the cybersecurity regime. It elaborates
how  the  climatic  conditions  in  the  EHN  create  extra  criticality  to
infrastructure.  The  chapter  examines  the  interactions,  pros  and  cons  of
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different  categories  of  regulatory  instrument  mixes  and  how  they  are
connected to collateral governance issues and human security.
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 2 Theorising security: A human
security perspective on cybersecurity
Gerald Zojer
Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
Executive Summary
Rapidly advancing digitalisation is promoted in the northernmost areas of
Finland,  Norway  and Sweden –  the  European High North  (EHN).  This
peripheral  region  is  characterised  by  a  sparse  population  density,  less
developed infrastructure and harsh climate. It is also the homeland of the
Sámi,  an  Indigenous  people  with  several  small  language  groups.
Acknowledging  the  importance  of  information  and  communications
technologies for the functioning of contemporary societies, the EHN states
have endorsed information and/or cybersecurity strategies. These strategies
aim to safeguard information and information infrastructure to encourage
business development and allow society to benefit from digitalisation. Yet,
these strategies fail to fully recognise the challenges and threats that people
experience  in  everyday  life  from  increasingly  digitalised  services  or  to
acknowledge regional  peculiarities  within the  states.  Utilising a human-
centred  security  approach  to  digitalisation  can  supplement  the  current
cybersecurity frameworks. Such a comprehensive framework can be built
on  the  human  security  approach.  While  acknowledging  the  concerns
already addressed by cybersecurity, such a broadened approach extends the
existing framework by including challenges at the individual and sub-state
community levels. A human-centred cybersecurity approach can therefore
contribute to the development of meaningful and targeted policies that move
human wellbeing into the focus of cybersecurity.
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 2.1 Introduction
Digitalisation  is  advancing  quickly,  especially  in  the  countries  of  the
European High North (EHN). This is not at last due to the states’ policies
regarding  digitalisation.  In  the  European  Commission’s  2019  Digital
Economic and Society Index (DESI), Finland, Norway and Sweden were
among the top five performing countries. For instance, the country reports
for the EHN stated that 99% of Finnish, 94% of Norwegian and 96% of
Swedish households have access to the 4G network (European Commission,
2019),  which  is  currently  the  fastest  implementation  of  mobile  cellular
network technology available for  end users.1 Finland,  moreover,  was the
first  country  to  make  access  to  broadband  a  basic  right  (Ministry  of
Transport  and  Communications,  2010).  Also,  the  digitalisation  of  public
services, such as education, health and public administration, is progressing
quickly  in  the  EHN.  From  a  governmental  viewpoint,  the  move  to
increasingly digitise services is often justified by gains in (cost) efficiency,
especially  in  areas  with  diminishing  populations,  such  as  the  EHN.
However,  growing  digitalisation  also  creates  new  dependencies  and
reinforces social exclusion (see also Gulbrandsen & Sheehan, forthcoming).
States have responded to the increasing importance of digital infrastructure
for societal functioning by endorsing cybersecurity strategies, which aim to
protect critical infrastructure. Yet, these strategies fall short of addressing
new  challenges  that  people  experience  in  their  everyday  lives  due  to
digitalisation (Hossain, Salminen, & Zojer, forthcoming; Salminen, 2019;
Salminen & Hossain, 2018; Zojer, 2019b). This chapter discusses a widened
1 The fifth generation (5G) is still in its early roll-out phase and not yet available for wide
public use.
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security approach to the challenges created by digitalisation in the EHN. In
order to do so, it utilises human security approaches to promote a bottom-up
security  approach.  Such a  comprehensive  cybersecurity  understanding  is
better  suited  to  capture  the  challenges  originating  from digitalisation  in
everyday life  situations for  individuals  and communities  at  the sub-state
level  and can be applied as a  tool  to  identify and asses  challenges in  a
region-specific context.
 2.2 Digitalisation and cybersecurity
In policy documents and development strategies of all the EHN countries
and regions, the advancement of digitalisation plays an important role in
promoting  the  efficiency  of  public  services  as  well  as  (new)  business
opportunities.  With  increasing  digitalisation,  the  functioning  of  society
becomes  more  and  more  reliant  on  undisrupted  information  and
communication technologies (ICTs). At the same time, physically available
services, such as public administration or health services, are not only being
replaced by digital services but are decaying or being dismantled. Further,
ICTs  and  digital  technologies  are  vulnerable,  for  example,  due  to
connectivity  problems,  technical  failures,  human abuse  of  vulnerabilities
and  human  error.  Such  challenges  have  been  addressed  by  information
security  and  cybersecurity  frameworks.2 When  entire  societies’  ICT
infrastructures  are  challenged,  the  question  of  security  shifts  from  the
individual or organisational level to the state level. Thus, most states have
endorsed cybersecurity strategies in order to bring attention to questions of
2 At the organisational level, the terms information security and cybersecurity are often
used synonymously.
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information security at the state level. The difference, therefore, is that the
state carries out the responsibility for the production of security (Salminen,
2019; Salminen, Zojer, & Hossain, forthcoming; Zojer, 2019b).
 2.2.1 Current cybersecurity approach in the European High 
North
Generally,  cybersecurity  refers  to  securing  the  digital  ecosystem  that
constantly interacts with operations in the physical environment (Limnéll,
Majewski, & Salminen, 2015). When cybersecurity is conceptualised at the
national level, it usually focuses on threats to infrastructure critical for the
functioning  of  the  states’ society.  It  references  threats  originating  from
cybercrime, cyberwarfare, hacktivism or espionage and is concerned about
the defence of cyberspace from cyberattacks (Kostopoulos, 2013; Kramer,
Starr,  & Wentz,  2009;  Zojer,  2019a,  p.  175).  Yet,  in  the  absence  of  an
univocal or unanimous definition of cybersecurity, this chapter utilises the
national approaches of the EHN states.
Finland’s 2019 cybersecurity strategy is scarce in its  definitions,  but  the
preceding strategy from 2013 stated that cybersecurity ‘means the desired
end state in which the cyber domain is reliable and in which its functioning
is ensured’ (Secretariat of the Security Committee, 2013, p. 1). The 2019
strategy aims at  safeguarding vital  societal  functions that  depend on the
cyber  domain  as  well  as  supporting  the  availability  of  reliable  digital
services and business development. The guidelines of the strategy are based
on three pillars: a) to develop international cooperation in order to protect
the  cyber  environment  without  borders;  b)  better  coordination  of
cybersecurity management, entailing planning and preparedness; and c) the
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development  of  cyber competence by increasing everyday skills  and top
skills as a means of safeguarding cybersecurity (Secretariat of the Security
Committee, 2019). The Swedish cybersecurity strategy aims at managing
risks  inherent  to  digitalisation  that  impact  prosperity  and  security.
Cybersecurity  ‘concerns  the  whole  society’ and  everyone ‘needs to  take
responsibility for cyber security issues’ (Ministry of Justice, 2017, p. 3). The
objectives  are  to  protect  the  lives  and  health  of  the  population,  the
functioning  of  society  and  the  capacity  to  uphold  fundamental  values,
including democracy, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms as well as
national  growth  and  competitiveness,  by  ‘a  set  of  security  measures  to
preserve  the  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  of  information’
(Ministry  of  Justice,  2017,  p.  4).  The  Norwegian  strategy  defines
cybersecurity  as  the  protection  ‘of  data  and  systems  connected  to  the
Internet’ (Ministry  of  Government  Administration,  Reform  and  Church
Affairs, 2013, p. 28). The goal of the strategy is to create robust and secure
ICT infrastructure,  tackle  adverse  ICT events  and  increase  the  level  of
competence and security awareness.
 2.2.2 Commonalities and shortcomings
The three cybersecurity strategies are similar in that there is only a limited
role  allocated  to  individuals  and  their  everyday  experiences  with  digital
technologies. The wellbeing of the people is considered to be dependent on
ICTs,  but  people  can  also  cause  problems  through  negligence  or
malevolence. In all these strategies, it is the cyber domain – information,
data and systems – that is constructed as the referent object of cybersecurity
rather  than the people.  Instead,  human individuals  are treated as threats,
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weak links, victims, or as factors who pose a potential risk to  information
security (Salminen, 2018; 2019; Salminen & Hossain, 2018; Salminen et al.,
forthcoming;  Zojer,  2019a;  2019b).  This  approach  to  cybersecurity  can
therefore  be  compared  with  a  traditional  security  approach,  wherein  the
state’s interests are the referent object of security. However, such a state-
centric approach runs the risk of failing to address the challenges and threats
originating  from digitalisation  in  everyday  life  and  in  a  sub-national  or
regional  context.  The  complex  interrelation  between  digitalisation  and
societal  development  requires  a  more  comprehensive  approach  to  these
multifaceted  challenges  in  order  to  facilitate  human  development  and
prosperity  (Collins,  forthcoming;  Salminen,  2018;  Salminen  & Hossain,
2018;  Salminen  et  al.,  forthcoming;  Zojer,  2019b).  A  human-centred
security  approach  enables  individuals  and  communities  to  vocalise  their
fears and challenges and empowers them to address issues that originate
from state actions and that might be detrimental to societal integrity at the
sub-state level (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2012; Hossain, Zojer, Greaves, Roncero,
& Sheehan, 2017). Finally, states’ measures to provide cybersecurity may in
fact pose new challenges and risks to information security at the individual
level (Dunn Cavelty, 2014). Therefore, this chapter argues that a human-
centred  approach  to  cybersecurity  can  help  to  reveal  the  challenges
digitalisation  brings  to  people’s  everyday  lives  while  also  considering
region-specific peculiarities.
 2.3 The human security discourse
Within the academic field of international relations, traditional approaches
to security studies have dealt with threats to sovereign states (for example,
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Mearsheimer, 2014; Waltz, 2010). Towards the end of the 20th century, and
especially during the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, the scope of security
studies  broadened  to  also  include  sectors  such  as  the  environment  or
societies at the sub-state level (for example, Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde,
1998;  Heininen,  2013;  Hoogensen  Gjørv,  Bazely,  Goloviznina,  &
Tanentzap,  2014;  McSweeney,  1999).  These  new approaches  to  security
changed the scope and nature of security threats, which were recognised as
being socially constructed. Such critical security theories led to questioning
of the ontological and epistemological basis of security studies as a field.
This led to the development of more complex and comprehensive concepts
of security, with human security gaining prominence and popularity within
the global political discourse, resulting in numerous state and multilateral
policies  (Gulbrandsen & Sheehan, forthcoming),  such as the Millennium
Development Goals or the Sustainable Development Goals. Instead of state
sovereignty, these widened security approaches focused on the wellbeing of
individuals and communities at the sub-state level and thus centred around
threats  to  human  wellbeing.  The  human  security  concept  became
popularised  through  the  publication  of  the  United  Nations  Development
Programme’s (1994) Human Development Report (HDR). Together with the
emergence of critical approaches to security, these developments enabled
and  accelerated  the  move  towards  multiple  sectors  of  security  and  the
adoption  of  human  individuals  and  sub-state  communities  as  referent
objects of security (Gulbrandsen & Sheehan, forthcoming), which has been
claimed to be a new paradigm of security (Commission on Human Security,
2003).
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 2.3.1 Defining human security
There  is  no  universally  accepted  definition  of  human  security.  Some
scholars have discussed human security in a rather narrow sense, delimiting
its meaning to the protection of communities or individuals from physical
violence (for example, Human Security Centre, 2005). Using such a narrow
understanding,  the  concept  might  even  be  applied  to  legitimise  military
interventions as a political tool, such as through the responsibility to protect
(R2P) commitment, which allows the international community to intervene
in states that fail to protect their own people from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity (Zojer, 2019b, p. 300). Yet, the
most  common  understanding  of  human  security  expands  the  concept
‘beyond physical  violence as the only relevant threat/vector;  and beyond
physical  harm as  the  only  relevant  damage’ (Gasper,  2014,  p.  32).  The
Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 4),  defined human security as
‘the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that  enhance
human freedoms and human fulfilment’, including ‘processes that build on
people’s  strengths  and  aspirations.  It  means  creating  political,  social,
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give
people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’. This people-
centred approach to security focuses on what people need in order to live in
freedom from fear and freedom from want. Human security thus ‘sits on
interstices of human rights,  human development  and security discourses’
(Martin & Owen, 2014, p. 1) and conceptualises culture, identity and human
progress as needing to be protected.
Using  such  a  broad  understanding,  the  human  security  approach
acknowledges that security threats not only originate from physical violence
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(freedom from fear) but that societal security also depends on the absence of
threats to ideational or material freedoms (freedom from want). To apply
such a broad and human-centred security approach, many have built their
definition on the concept  established in the 1994 HDR, which identified
seven key areas of human security: economic, food, health, environmental,
personal,  community  and  political  security.  All  of  these  aspects  are
considered  individually  important,  yet  they  are  also  interconnected  and
sometimes even conflicting. For instance, a sound environment is important
for providing healthy and nutritious food, but environmental integrity may
at the same time be challenged by economic development. Because of the
complex  interrelation  of  the  different  sectors  and  in  the  absence  of  a
unanimous or  univocal  definition,  the  concept  has  also been  exposed  to
criticism. Paris (2001, p. 91), for instance, argued that if ‘human security
means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing’. Krause (2004, p.
367) warned that in order to be a useful concept, human security must avoid
becoming ‘a loose synonym for “bad things that can happen”’. However,
when human security is not reduced to a predetermined list of issues or to a
narrow definition, it is ‘flexible enough to allow for a deeper understanding
of  the  root  of  insecurities  and  capacities  to  address  them’ (Tadjbakhsh,
2014, p. 54). The Nobel prize laureate Amartya Sen (2014, p. 22) pointed
out  that  ‘the  very  lack  of  a  general  theory  allows  an  openness  that  is
important  for  this  kind  of  work’.  Consequently,  a  broad  and  flexible
application of the human security approach creates a framework that allows
for the assessment of security threats at the individual and sub-state levels in
a region- and issue-specific context (Hossain et al., 2017; Zojer, 2019b).
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 2.3.2 The interconnectedness of digitalisation and human 
security in the European High North
Due to the rapid process of digitalisation and the wide diffusion of personal
computers and other electronic devices (such as smartphones, the Internet of
Things,  etc.),  ICTs  have  become  one  of  the  most  significant  areas  of
technological  progress and are interdependent with societal  development.
ICTs can thus play an important role in safeguarding human security ‘since
they are among the major sources of strengths in improving the quality of
living across the world’ (Sen, 2014, p. 24). For instance, acknowledging the
importance of the internet, the international community has identified the
intentional  disruption  or  prevention  of  dissemination  of  or  access  to
information  from  the  internet  as  a  violation  of  human  rights  (General
Assembly  resolution  32/13).  However,  the  interconnectedness  of
digitalisation and societal development is related to regional particularities,
which  bring  with  them  a  new  set  of  challenges.  The  EHN  can  be
characterised  as  peripheral  within  the  EHN  states;  having  a  sparse
population  density  with  long  distances  to  reach  certain  services  (health,
education, public administration, etc.);  having a harsh climate with long,
cold and dark winters;  being shaped by an  economy wherein traditional
activities and subsistence, such as reindeer herding or fishing, still play an
important  role for  many individuals and communities;  and having a less
developed infrastructure, such as health care or ICTs, than in the southern
parts of the EHN countries. Furthermore, the EHN is also the homeland for
the Sámi, an Indigenous people with several small language groups. Thus,
digitalisation  creates  new  opportunities  as  well  as  challenges  that  are
specific to the region. Zojer (2019b) pointed out that all seven key areas of
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human security are affected by digitalisation in a region-specific context.
For example,  utilising telemedicine allows medical  professionals to offer
services in remote areas, improving health and decreasing the need to travel
long distances, therefore mitigating environmental impacts related to traffic.
However, as Gulbrandsen and Sheehan point out in this volume (chapter 4),
the increasing digitalisation of  health services  can also be interpreted as
thinning out the welfare state and decreasing access to physical contact with
health professionals. As highlighted by regional and national digitalisation
and  development  strategies,  the  increased  use  of  ICTs  may  bring  new
economic  opportunities  by  enabling  local  businesses  to  access  global
markets; however, online shopping also challenges existing retailers. Digital
devices,  such  as  global  positioning  system  trackers,  may  increase  the
efficiency  of  traditional  activities  such  as  reindeer  herding  and  can
furthermore  be  used  for  planning  land  use  with  different  stakeholders
(Zojer,  2019b,  pp.  311–314),  but  they  also  have  the  potential  to  disrupt
traditional  knowledge,  which  is  crucial  for  the  sustenance  of  cultural
integrity, especially for the Indigenous population. Digital technologies can
be used to store traditional knowledge and make it accessible; however, due
to the interoperability of modern technologies with the nature of traditional
knowledge, this is not an easy task (Pettersen, 2011). The internet and social
media can be used to keep in touch with members of (language) minority
groups, thereby contributing to maintaining culture and language, but it can
also lead to digital exclusion, challenge local culture through the influence
of global culture or be used for harassment or hate speech, which can create
additional  burdens  for  members  of  marginalised  or  already  vulnerable
groups.  ICTs  can  also  be  used  to  increase  participation  possibilities  in
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political processes or environmental impact assessments, whereas the same
technologies  can be abused for  state  oppression (Dymet,  2019;  Hossain,
2019; Zojer, 2019b, pp. 315–317; Zojer & Hossain, 2017, p. 45).
 2.4 Deconstructing the mainstream 
conceptualisations and re-constructing 
cybersecurity as human centred
The countries  and  regions of  the  EHN promote  digitalisation  because  it
provides opportunities. Not only does it create a technological foundation
for new ways of doing things, it can also help to reduce costs and increase
efficiency. At the same time, it generates friction and dissatisfaction because
it  creates  new  types  of  vulnerabilities,  problems  or  exclusion.  While
cybersecurity  is  aimed  at  safeguarding  the  opportunities  that  come with
digitalisation, it  does not perform well  in capturing or responding to the
challenges that people face in everyday life (Salminen et al., forthcoming).
Moreover, the current national cybersecurity frameworks focus on threats at
the  national  level  but  fall  short  of  capturing  the  specific  challenges
digitalisation generates in a local context, such as in the EHN. However, in
the  end,  the  aim  of  cybersecurity  frameworks  is  to  safeguard  societal
integrity  and  to  promote  human  development.  To  do  so,  a  meaningful
cybersecurity  framework  needs  to  be  comprehensive.  First,  it  needs  to
understand that human wellbeing cannot be delimited to financial wealth
but that it also includes non-material values such as spirituality or cultural
integrity. The very purpose of the HDRs has been to challenge the common
narratives  of  national  and  international  development  politics  to  shift
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attention  from  a  pecuniary  focus  and  to  highlight  a  multidimensional
understanding of  human development that  focuses on people’s  wellbeing
(Haq,  1995).  Second,  the  techno-determinist  narrative  of  cybersecurity
needs  to  be  overcome.  Technology  is  not  a  neutral  object  but  rather  it
embeds culture and politics and is thus socially constructed (Bijker, Hughes,
&  Pinch,  2012;  Latour,  2004;  MacKenzie  &  Wajcman,  1999;  Winner,
1980). Third, the impacts of technological progress, such as digitalisation,
differ  depending  on  the  cultural,  socio-economic  and  environmental
peculiarities of a region. Since national strategies and policies are usually
made in the states’ capitals (far south of the EHN regions), there is danger
that  policy  makers  are  not  fully  aware  of  the  particularities  of  the
northernmost parts of their countries.
The concept of human security as a security approach has the breadth and
flexibility  that  is  necessary  to  analyse  the  complex  and  multifaceted
interrelations between digitalisation and societal dynamics at the sub-state
level,  thus  allowing  for  the  focus  of  security  concerns  to  be  shifted  to
human wellbeing. The human security approach can be applied to particular
issues  that  are  of  interest  in  order  to  raise  awareness  of  and  motivate
response to these issues (Gómez & Gasper, n.d.). It can be used to identify
existential threats to individuals and communities and therefore it  can be
used as a policy-making tool (Floyd, 2007). It empowers people by listening
to their fears and challenges and also can unveil threats that people perceive
as originating from states’ actions. It makes people into securitising actors,
hence  contributing  to  building  their  capacity  (Hoogensen  Gjørv,  2012).
Consequently,  the  human  security  approach  offers  a  tool  set  that  can
supplement the current cybersecurity framework to become more sensitive
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to  the  impacts  of  digitalisation  in  people’s  everyday  lives  in  a  region-
specific context. It therefore could serve to create new understandings and
insights into specific vulnerabilities. The current cybersecurity frameworks
do address issues that are important for the inhabitants of the EHN, as a
fully  operational  cyber  infrastructure  is  necessary  to  maintain  the
functioning of digitalised societies. However, the human security approach
also includes difficult and traditional security concerns.  Thus, applying a
human  security  approach  could  close  the  gap  between  traditional
cybersecurity  issues  and  a  human-centred  agenda,  allowing  countries  to
respond to the many opportunities and challenges related to digitalisation.
Similar to the widening of the traditional security approach in international
relations, a multidimensional and comprehensive cybersecurity approach is
better suited to address the challenges digitalisation creates. Applying such
a human-centred cybersecurity framework can therefore contribute to the
development of meaningful and targeted cyber policies and advance human
wellbeing  in  a  society  that  is  being  rapidly  transformed  through
digitalisation.
 2.5 Conclusions
Digitalisation  in  the  EHN  is  progressing  rapidly  and  affects  people’s
everyday  lives  in  many  regards.  States’  and  regional  policies  towards
digitalisation  highlight  the  benefits  and  opportunities  it  brings  forth  and
focus  on  securing  cyber  infrastructure  in  order  to  safeguard  its  positive
effects.  At  the  national  level,  the  EHN  countries  have  endorsed
cybersecurity strategies for this purpose. However, these strategies mainly
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refer to safeguarding infrastructure rather than human wellbeing and fail to
address challenges in a region-specific context.
This chapter suggests that utilising the human security framework can bring
additional value to identifying the needs, fears and challenges created by
digitalisation. Its breadth and flexibility are responsive to a region-specific
context  and allow individuals  and communities  to raise their  voices  and
express the challenges they perceive. It uses a people-centred perspective by
making  the  human individual  the  referent  object  of  security.  Utilising  a
human-centred  cybersecurity  approach  can  therefore  contribute  to
developing  meaningful  and  targeted  policies  addressing  the  needs  and
challenges of the local population, thus improving human wellbeing.
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Executive Summary
This chapter draws attention to the effects that cyberspace and the use of
information and communication technologies (ICTs) have on citizens and
civil  society  organisations  in  the  European  High  North  (EHN).  We
particularly examine the benefits and constraints arising from digitalisation
in Northern Norway. This is further explored from a community, regional
and  cross-border  perspective.  The  qualitative  methods  of  analysis  used
include  structured  and  semi-structured  interviews.  The  interviews  were
conducted  at  five  different  non-profit  civil  society  organisations.
Additionally,  a  workshop using semi-structured questions was conducted
with local inhabitants of Tromsø.
The results of our work include a framework of analysis that can be used as
a tool to understand and study civil society in light of the changes brought
by digitalisation and ICTs. Moreover, preliminary findings and observations
on the perceived integrating and disintegrating effects of digitalisation on
civil society in Northern Norway are presented. Civil society in the EHN is
both the subject and object of multiple digital and cybersecurity policies. In
this regard, our future research will focus on cybersecurity and civil society
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developments in Northern Norway and will include other case studies, a
larger study sample and the application of mixed research methods.
 3.1 Introduction
The  emergence  of  cyberspace,  the  widespread  use  of  information  and
communication  technologies  (ICTs)  and  the  digitalisation  of  important
societal  services  have  transformed  the  way  of  life  for  individuals,
communities and societies. It is therefore important to move from a mere
technological  understanding of  cyberspace and ICTs to a  more profound
understanding  of  the  effects  of  ICTs  on  democratic  politics,  societal
processes, changes and emancipation.
This chapter examines the beneficial effects as well as the downsides and
risks  arising  from  digitalisation  and  its  implications  for  citizens  and
especially civil society in Northern Norway. Civil society can be seen as a
major  component  of  the  society–state  relationship,  and  this  relation  is
essential in defining the socio-political system of any modern state.
As  with  other  communities  in  the  European  High  North  (EHN),  local
communities in Norway are objects and subjects of a diverse array of digital
policies. On the one hand, this means that they have a decisive role in co-
defining post-modern cyber reality. On the other hand, it means that they are
vulnerable to the pressures of globalisation and nation-state policies.
We  identified  a  lack  of  research  and  case  studies  on  the  effects  of
cyberspace on citizens and civil society in the EHN. Our task was to first
develop  a  generic  framework  of  analysis  to  make  sense  of
digitalisation/civil society interaction that is applicable in this region and
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beyond and to second use this tool to understand and empirically analyse
civil  society  in  light  of  changes  brought  about  by  the  emergence  of
cyberspace.
Our research addresses human security questions in Northern Norway to
give a voice to citizens, local communities and civil society. It particularly
focuses on economic, social, political and environmental dimensions from
the  perspective  of  individual  citizens/inhabitants  and  civil  society
organisations. Although there are always several causal factors affecting the
formation of societies, our task leads us to focus especially on cyberspace-
related phenomena, such as the internet, social media, ICTs and so forth.
 3.2 Cyberspace and civil society
Our initial research sought to illustrate and analyse some of the effects of
cyberspace on civil society. In order to do so, a framework for analysis was
created.  This  was  used  in  conjunction  with  small-scale  observations
conducted at civil society organisations. We then mainly focused on themes
such  as  self-organisation,  participatory  democracy,  participation  in
governance, immigration issues and cross-border cooperation. Additionally,
our  work  has  pinpointed  some  of  the  threats  and  risks  created  by
cyberspace. 
Our work also highlights cyber-dependent infrastructures and vital societal
functions in the context of long distances, limited accessibility and harsh
environmental and climatological conditions. Challenges and threats arising
from social  phenomena such  as  cross-border  organised  crime,  terrorism,
jihadism, xenophobic groupings and radicalisation are also addressed. 
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We  started  with  an  extensive  literature  review  in  order  to  identify  the
research  problems  and  gaps  in  the  aforementioned  research  areas.
Methodologically, relevant statistics and data such as qualitative interviews
and social  media outputs  were collected.  The initial  data collection took
place in Tromsø and Oslo. The selected and detailed case studies allowed us
to address the issues mentioned under the two blocks.
Although the main geographic focus is on Northern Norway, our research
also  includes  some comparative  perspectives  between  Northern  Norway,
Norway at  large,  other  Nordic  countries  and  beyond.  A complementary,
comparative approach is useful to gain understanding of whether location
makes a difference in cyberspace, and if so, to understand the mechanisms
through which this has developed.
 3.2.1 Research questions
The research questions addressed in this study include:
• What effect has the emergence of cyberspace and ICTs had on civil
society (citizens) and civil society organisations in the Norwegian 
High North? 
• What advantages/benefits (social, economic, organisational, etc.) 
do civil society organisations in the Norwegian High North 
experience or have experienced over the last years? due to the use 
of the internet and ICTs?
• Regarding cyberspace and the use of ICTs, what constraints or 
disadvantages do such organisations experience? 
• How have particular organisations changed and if so, through 
which mechanisms? 
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• Has a transnational dimension enhanced the emergence of 
cyberspace? If so, how or through which mechanisms? 
• Have ICTs enhanced political participation and contact with 
authorities? If so, how?
• Has cyberspace enhanced or decreased social phenomena such as 
radicalisation, extremism or xenophobia? If so, what have been the
effects?
• Have cyberspace and ICTs helped further cross-border 
communication and the presence of organisations? If so, how?
 3.2.2 An analysis of cyberspace and its effects on civil society
Numerous societal and organisational changes have appeared as a result of
the emergence of cyberspace and digitalisation. In order to analyse the areas
in which  such  changes have  taken  place,  a  framework  for  analysis  was
created to classify and understand the nature of these changes. 
Our first publication on the subject (in Montalvan Castilla and Pursiainen,
2019) is an exploratory study that examined the effects of cyberspace on
one part of a democratic society, namely civil society.
Civil  society  is  a  major  component  of  society–state  relations,  and  these
relations can be understood as the main ingredient in defining the socio-
political system of any post-modern state. Thus, in order to argue that the
emergence of cyberspace is constitutive as to the nature and characteristics
of civil society, we must move from a mere technological understanding of
cyberspace  to  a  more  profound  understanding  that  considers  democratic
politics and emancipation.
29
Civil society is a very complex issue, and the concept has been the focus of
political philosophers in the past two centuries. Although the issues at stake
amount  to  a  veritable  battlefield  of  different  conceptions,  we  have
simplified the issue by dividing the understandings of civil society into four
categories: apolitical, political, transnational and ‘uncivic’ (for example, the
mafia) civil societies.
Consequently, we are concerned with the question of what kinds of civil
society  cyberspace  enables  or  enhances  and  what  kinds  it  limits  or
constrains. This framework for analysis is presented in Table 1. 
Effects of 
digitalization
Apolitical civil 
society
Political  civil 
society 
Transnational 
civil society
Uncivic civil 
society
Enhances Entrepreneurship 
(and possibly 
individualism)
Visibility
Mobilisation and 
recruiting
Two-way and 
mass 
communication
Cost reduction 
and efficiency
The construction 
of social and 
political 
consciousness
Visibility
Mobilisation and 
recruitment
Two-way and 
mass 
communication
Bottom-up 
initiatives to 
challenge or 
influence elite 
decision-making
Cross-border 
learning and 
exchange of ideas
Cross-border 
concrete 
collaborative 
efforts and 
mobilisation
Cost-reduction 
and efficiency
Manipulation of 
popular opinion
Recruitment and 
mobilisation 
intolerance- or 
violence-based 
extreme right-
wing, left-wing 
and jihadist 
groupings
Cyber crime 
targeting to 
cyberspace assets,
or using it as a 
tool to reach non-
cyber assets
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Constrains Resource-
consuming, and 
therefore favours 
larger 
organisations
Favours 
organisations 
with younger 
members
Digital exclusion 
on individual or  
group level
Impersonalisation
of 
communication, 
leading to 
(cultural) 
misunderstanding
s and lack of trust
Fear of cyber 
insecurity
Political 
manipulation 
through 
cyberspace
Authoritarian 
countries or large 
companies 
control the 
cyberspace and 
use it for their 
own benefit
Overoptimism of 
digital power to 
create political 
change
Benefits one-
issue activist 
more than 
established 
political 
movements
Relies largely on 
existing beliefs 
Fear of cyber 
insecurity
Cyber security 
problems 
(sensitive 
information, 
espionage)
Ignorance of the 
of criticism of 
transnational civil
society of the 
cyberspace 
campaigns
Overoptimism of 
digital power to 
create political 
change
Focus deflected 
away from off-
line activism
Communication 
spaces can be 
infiltrated, 
monitored, 
hacked and traced
back in forensic 
investigations by 
the authorities or 
activist groups 
State and public-
private strategies 
and activities to 
fight cyber crime 
by capacity- and 
capability 
building
Table 1: Framework for Analysis (Montalvan Castilla and Pursiainen, 2019).
Through reorganising the existing research according to our framework and
adding our own small-scale observations and interviews, we aimed to make
sense of empirical cyberspace developments in relation to different modes
of civil society activities. Although the empirical focus was on (Northern)
Norway, we believe that the framework of analysis developed here can be
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applied and tailored to any society. It is expected that this framework will
facilitate the understanding of the societal changes created by digitalisation. 
 3.2.3 Methodology
We first studied the online media profiles, presence and activities of five
civil  society organisations.  These organisations were dedicated to human
rights, advocating for children’s rights and protection, humanitarianism and,
in  two  cases,  the  environment.  Careful  observations  were  conducted
regarding a) the interactions of the organisations with general citizens and
other  members  of  the  organisation,  b)  their  capacity  to  influence  and
mediate political and civic arenas and c) their contact and/or cooperation
with other civil society organisations abroad. 
Secondly,  we  visited  these  organisations  and  conducted  in-person
interviews.  Semi-structured  interviews  were  chosen  as  a  preferable
qualitative research method because of their open structure. An interview
guide with the main themes and questions was prepared. These themes and
questions allowed participants to present their own concerns and narratives
regarding the effects of cyberspace on their organisations. 
In most cases, the main interviewees were the leaders of the organisations.
A few other  people  working  in  such  organisations  also  participated  and
responded  to  some  of  the  questions.  One  of  the  organisations  had  a
professional department for the management of social media networks. In
this  case,  a  full-length  interview was  conducted  with  the  leader  of  this
department  in  order  to  understand  organisational  changes,  benefits  and
challenges that the emergence of cyberspace may have brought. 
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The humanitarian organisation interviewed was divided into several local
departments and/or work teams that addressed different societal needs and
provided  community  services.  We  primarily  interviewed  the  search  and
rescue  department  and  the  department  responsible  for  the  integration  of
refugees in Northern Norway.
The organisations were chosen because of their active presence in Northern
Norway and their transnational dimension, meaning that they continue to
expand  or  grow  and  have  established  transnational  contacts  and
partnerships.  The  literature  shows  that  the  emergence  of  cyberspace  or
networked  communications  have  had  a  huge  impact  in  the  way
organisations,  particularly  civil  society  ones,  work,  develop  or  are
strengthened.  This  is  mainly  noticeable  through  international  contacts,
alliances or partnerships that partially and increasingly rely on digital ICTs
for cooperation. In some cases, contact and joint work between civil society
organisations in different countries would not have been possible without
the emergence of cyberspace and ICTs.
Having formulated our tentative empirical conclusions, in the final phase of
our study we summarised them into five simple multiple-choice questions
used  in  an  online  survey.  This  survey  was  sent  to  15  organisations  to
confirm our conclusions.
 3.2.4 Results
Our  findings  illustrated  that  cyberspace  and  ICTs  have  contributed  to
significant  changes  in  present  day  Norwegian  civil  societies.  However,
while  these  changes  have  been  profound  in  fields  such  as  internal  and
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external  communication  and  interaction  between members,  the  public  at
large and authorities, they are rather instrumental, not affecting the basic
norms, cultures, goals and interests of the organisations.
After exploring some of these changes, it can be concluded that cyberspace
has both enhanced and constrained civil  society.  Thus, we identified the
need  to  analyse  these  enhancing  and  constraining  effects  through  a
comprehensive theoretical framework. In our analysis of societal changes
due to the rise of cyberspace and ICTs, we identified four types of civil
society: apolitical, political, transnational and uncivic. 
Our research findings showed that cyberspace has opened new paths for
both  entrepreneurship  and  individualism  for  the  apolitical  civil  society.
Additionally,  we  noticed  that  although  cyberspace  presents  itself  as
beneficial  in  many  aspects  for  the  transnational  civil  society,  some
constraining  elements  can  be  identified.  For  instance,  social  media
platforms are resource and time demanding. This implies that organisations
with more resources will have a stronger online presence and potentially
attract new members. Thus, these findings shed light on the role that web
technologies may play in furthering inequality.
It appears that the emergence of cyberspace has revolutionised the political
civil society. Earlier studies (e.g. Howard and Hussain, 2013; Papacharissi,
2004) showed that the potential for civil discourse in cyberspace is strong
and  that  it  might  promote  democratic  emancipation  and  political
engagement/participation.
Thus, it appears that digital technologies facilitate the construction of social
and political consciousness. In the case of Norway, the evidence suggests
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that  these  technologies  have  considerably  enhanced  civic  and  political
engagement.  For  instance,  Facebook’s  ad  hoc  groups  and  their
communicative power have the potential to raise societally and politically
important issues among the public as well as initiate changes. Social media
can also exert a strong effect on mobilisation. This can have a direct impact
on local communities, concretising local help and development initiatives.
In  some instances,  cyberspace  appears  to  have  become a  meeting  point
between people and politicians.
Cyberspace has also had an impact on the transnational  dimension. Data
coming from researchers at the Norwegian Centre for Research on Civil
Society  and  the  Voluntary  Sector  (see  Arnesen  et  al.,  2016;  Eimhjellen,
2013, 2014; Eimhjellen and Ljunggren, 2017) showed that some Norwegian
non-governmental  organizations  have  benefited  from  social  media
platforms, which allow them to keep in contact  with other organisations.
Our own findings at  a humanitarian organisation in the Norwegian High
North  illustrated  the  cross-border  connections  that  can  be  established
through  digital  technologies.  This  organisation  works,  exchanges
information and coordinates online with another one in Murmansk.
However, mistrust and scepticism toward the internet as an effective place
for  civic  participation  have  occurred.  For  instance,  cybersecurity  issues
regarding the exchange of sensitive information online have been reported.
Finally, the uncivil dimension of civil society illustrates the issues arising
from openly intolerant and sometimes extremist groups that use cyberspace
to  communicate.  We  illustrate  this  by  studying  well-known  groups  in
Norway  such  as  Stopp  islamiseringen  av  Norge  (popularly  known  as
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SIAN), which has thousands of members who communicate with each other
and  share  information  through  the  web  and  Facebook.  Additionally,
cybercrime and malicious or criminal acts have occurred in cyberspace. As
a result, the National Strategy for Information Security was implemented by
Norwegian authorities.
The above notwithstanding, we conclude (somewhat surprisingly given the
enthusiasm  for  cyberspace  as  an  ultimate  game  changer)  that  while
cyberspace has contributed to some seemingly significant changes in the
characteristics of Norwegian civil society, it is more a question of basically
instrumental  qualities  rather  than  intrinsic  transformation  of  the  society.
Cyberspace  itself  has  not  democratised  or  undemocratised  societies  by
changing the balance between different types of civil society activities or
the basic characteristics of society–state relations.
 3.3 Citizens’ perceptions on digitalisation: Benefits
and challenges
The changes, enablers and constraints brought by ICTs and their effects on
civil society can be better understood by approaching a combination of civil
society organisations, individuals and local communities in the EHN. In this
regard,  a  second study was  designed with the aim to hear  stakeholders’
perspectives and opinions on the effects of digitalisation in the region on
their interrelated everyday experiences.
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 3.3.1 Methodological considerations
The World Café methodology was applied. Also known as the Knowledge
Café methodology, it  consists of structured conversations taking place at
different tables. The discussions took place in a comfortable local café in
Tromsø. This atmosphere was chosen with the aim of helping participants
relax  and  facilitating  further  discussions.  The  12  participants  were  of
different  backgrounds  and  occupations  and  were  recruited  by  previous
familiarity and interest with the projects’ scope, through social media and
using snowball sampling. Among the participants were two local politicians
and the director of an important company with a large presence in the three
counties that comprise Northern Norway. Both genders were represented,
and the participants’ ages ranged from 23 to 60 years.  Three table hosts
were also present to moderate,  guide, focus and balance the discussions.
Their role was to ensure that everybody had a chance to speak, give their
opinions and share their relevant personal experiences.
Prior to the discussion, the workshop goals and details were introduced and
the  ethical  aspects  covered.  Six  main  themes  emerged  during  the
discussions. At the end of the sessions, the discussions were summarised.
The themes that were discussed were 1) use of ICTs in everyday life, 2)
aspects of life transformed (or not) by ICTs; satisfaction, fears and desires
regarding  particular  ICTs,  3)  factors  facilitating  or  hampering  digital
development and opinions on how to ensure the desired development and
prevent  counter-productive  development,  4)  fears,  desires  and  wishes
regarding  digital  and  technological  development,  5)  individual  power  of
influence on regional digital development, 6) digitalisation and the role of
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the  state,  regional  and  local  administration,  companies,  associations,
communities and individuals in developing and maintaining security and
trust.
 3.3.2 Preliminary results
 3.3.2.1 Perspectives on ICTs and their everyday use
Participants  were  most  satisfied  with  transport-related  digital  solutions.
Tromsø can experience harsh climatological conditions. Temperatures can
easily reach -11°C and feel like -16°C. Cold winds and heavy snow falls are
also common. The regular traffic flow can be substantially affected due to
heavy  snowfalls  or  icy  roads,  which  cause  accidents  and  delays.  The
municipality’s  real-time  application  (app)  showing  timetables,  routes,
connections and delays due to climatological conditions was thus praised.
Before this app appeared, users waited much longer at bus stops or missed
bus connections. The possibility to purchase bus or flight tickets through an
app and the municipal parking app were also appreciated.
Regarding ICTs, the use of e-mail, social media (predominantly Facebook,
Instagram and Twitter) and diverse websites was part of everyday life. Only
one participant said that they avoided social media. Facebook appeared to
be an important means of socialisation and organisation of work or study
events, facilitating local and global interaction.
ICTs  used  for  inclusive  purposes  and  in  the  educational  system  were
regarded as positive. Digital health services, such as health applications that
allow online communication between patients and medical personnel, were
seen  as  positive  by  some.  However,  the  fact  that  these  apps  and  online
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patient journals keep track of the patients’ medical  history, concerns and
communications was considered to be a risk and possible security threat.
Financially,  banking  and  financial  transactions  done  digitally  were
perceived as beneficial because they increase efficiency and productivity.
Regarding  digital  services  needed,  better  design  tools  for  architects  and
designers were requested along with (gender-based) applications focusing
on the security of women and apps to report on improvements needed in the
city, particularly in relation to lighting. Online shopping opportunities were
also  valued.  However,  participants  highlighted  the  need  to  reduce
consumption and further sustainability. Software applications focusing on a
sustainable  lifestyle  and  guiding  users  towards  plastic-free  or  ethically
produced items were also requested.
 3.3.2.2 Aspects of life transformed by ICTs: Satisfaction, 
fears, wishes and resistance regarding digital development
Parenting,  family  life,  level  and  quality  of  social  interaction,  education,
democracy  and  social  and  political  spheres  were  identified  as  areas
significantly  transformed  by  ICTs.  Moreover,  the  way  in  which  we
communicate has been transformed, as traditional time and place constraints
have  been  removed,  allowing  for  transnationalism.  Regarding  fears,  the
inability to sort out real news from fake news, propaganda and political and
social manipulation through the internet and social media were regarded as
concerning.
It was expressed that cyberspace had a positive effect on social interaction
and social capital. This was illustrated by the experiences of participants
who joined online groups. These groups (for example, those with social and
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humanitarian causes, political groups and hobby groups) connected people
with similar interests and goals, sometimes leading to offline meetings.
However,  many  reported  a  perceived  reduction  in  social  contact  or
interaction (such as fewer in-person meetings and lectures as well as fewer
workers at banks, libraries, supermarkets and stores due to being replaced
by automatised digital cashiers, chat bots and online assistants) due to ICTs.
Some participants  expressed the desire to  avoid a future  with decreased
human contact.
Participants also pointed out that digitalisation has transformed the dynamic
between students and teachers,  as students could rely on a vast  array of
online material and depend less on lessons at  the university. Satisfaction
was also expressed regarding the amount of  knowledge one can acquire
online, such as practical skills or formal knowledge in a particular field or
subject. The ability to research health issues and diseases and the possibility
to  share  information  online  or  communicate  with  others  experiencing
similar conditions was seen as a positive development.
Other major concerns were related to cyberspace being used as an arena for
bullying  and  exclusion.  Cybercrime,  the  hacking  of  smartphones  and  a
potential ‘surveillance nightmare’ or totalitarian technological surveillance
were  feared.  Participants  wished  to  avoid  a  future  were  all  personal
information is under the control of the government and private companies.
At the personal level,  the desire to preserve anonymity and privacy was
expressed.  Some participants  noted  that  in  modern  society,  children  are
exposed to society even before birth,  with ultrasound pictures posted on
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social  media.  Additionally,  some participants  saw as  more  negative  than
positive that children these days are tracked through smart devices.
 3.3.2.3 Digital development
Participants  found  cyber  insecurity  to  be  the  biggest  factor  impeding
positive  digital  development.  The  use  of  digital  health  services  (for
example, patient journals), digital post services, financial scams and use and
storage of personal information by websites were seen as potential threats to
information  security.  Other  related  counterproductive  factors  were  the
negative effects of ICTs on democracy due to manipulation of information
and the spreading of fake news.
According to some participants, measurements to prevent negative digital
development should involve actors such as the local government and public
libraries. Both institutions could provide more information and a space for
discussion among the city’s inhabitants on how to mitigate cyber insecurity
and its societal effects.
Factors  identified  as  hindrances  to  a  balanced  digital  development  were
online  phenomena  such  as  harassment,  hate  speech,  racism,  extremism,
xenophobia and bullying.  The creation of  large networks linked to child
abuse,  pornography  and  human  trafficking  was  also  seen  as  a  negative
aspect  of ICTs. Actions taken by the police to monitor, prevent and stop
such phenomena were thus deemed important.
Additionally,  the  digital  divide  and  exclusion,  particularly  of  elders  and
minorities,  were  seen  as  hindrances.  It  was  noted  that  technology has  a
tendency to overlook or exclude minorities in society. Consequently, digital
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technologies  are not  created  to  meet  their  needs.  Some participants  also
argued  that  ICTs  can  reinforce  class  differences  in  society,  pointing  to
differences between the people who produce or own the rights to diverse
ICTs, those who pay for them and those who have the adequate knowledge
to use them.
It was also stressed that despite the advantages offered by the digitalisation
of societal services, direct physical, cognitive or mental stimulation and a
greater  engagement  with  an  individual’s  surroundings  have  been
substantially hampered. Participants also acknowledged a lack of focus and
increasing disruptions, which occurred when participants became distracted
by the internet and social media while performing specific tasks at work,
home or university.
A main concern for many participants was that digitalisation may be driven
by economic interests and thus not always focus on the best interests of the
people.  Some  statements  that  illustrated  this  were:  ‘the  technological
development  is  enormously  driven…[by]  commercial  and  economic
interests’ and ‘it  is not technology that adapts to our needs. It is us who
adapt to the technological solutions that come along’.
Participants  also  discussed  whether  telemedicine  services  in  Northern
Norway are mainly driven by economics (focused on saving money and
resources) and not to the best interests of the patient. One positive aspect of
telemedicine  was  that  health  services  could  be  provided  to  populations
living in more remote areas.
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It  was  also  noted  by  participants  that  attended  so-called  ‘smart  city’
conferences in Norway and abroad, that these conferences often ended in
companies trying to promote and sell their services or technologies.
Participants negatively viewed companies’ practice of collecting user data to
target  potential  buyers  through  custom-made  advertisements,  predict
purchase patterns or influence customers. The development of eye-tracking
technology  and  filming  to  analyse  users’ preferences  was  also  seen  as
controversial. Equally, the imposition of smart electricity meters in Norway
was perceived as a potential danger. These meters report when a person is at
home as well as patterns connected to household activities.
Surveillance was perceived as a counter-productive factor for desirable ICT
developments. Although video cameras connected to the internet can often
be  used  for  security,  participants  were  concerned  that  widespread
surveillance can lead to the loss of privacy and freedom as well as increased
societal control.
Additionally, it was suggested that for positive development to take place,
state-based  research  should  be  conducted  before  acquiring  new
technologies. Likewise, personal awareness, discussions and reflection on
the  downsides  and  benefits  of  ICTs  were  viewed  as  necessary.  It  was
proposed that to facilitate positive development, the state and municipality
should have a clear overview of the needs, goals and wishes of the city and
its inhabitants. After this is done, the government can begin outlining the
pathway needed to bring about this technology. In relation to this, female
participants felt that new technologies should include gender perspectives.
This may increase security for women and other vulnerable groups.
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 3.3.2.4 Fears and desires regarding digital development
Common fears regarding digital development included an increasing digital
divide,  particularly  for  elders.  A  participant  illustrated  this  issue  by
mentioning  that  several  elders  visit  the  Norwegian  Labour  and  Welfare
Administration  to  request  assistance  submitting  online  forms  now  that
traditional paperwork is no longer an option.
Some  participants  agreed  that  despite  fears  and  perceptions  that  digital
development is purely economically oriented, the digitalisation of societal
services saves time and resources in the long term. One concern was that
patients who still wished to have in-person consultations might only have
the choice of online consultations, as the number of health care providers
has  been  drastically  reduced.  This  may  be  counterproductive  to  the
treatment of conditions such as depression.
Participants  requested  ICTs  to  track  and  prevent  criminal  behaviour,
especially against women and children. Participants also commented on the
terrorist attack in Norway by Anders Breivik, which resulted in the death of
77  people.  It  is  known that  Breivik  connected  with  others  with  similar
radical  views  online  and  received  their  support  and  encouragement.  In
Norway, operations such as the one known as ‘Dark Room’ serve men who
plan to rape children and share online materials of them being abused. For
some  participants,  these  examples  illustrated  that  cyberspace  can  be  an
arena for criminal associations.
Other desires included online apps that provide information about cultural
events and local history and places. Moreover, there was a desire for the
establishment  of  a  local  committee  on  ICTs and  digital  development.  A
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participant  noted  that  in  the  Tromsø  municipality,  there  are  permanent
committees for urban development, the private sector or industries, sports
and  the  educational  sector,  among others.  However,  he  stressed  that  the
local  political  organisation  lacks  and  needs  a  committee  that  will  work
towards positive digital development involving citizens.
 3.3.2.5 Individual power of influence on (regional) digital 
development
Most  participants expressed that  in order  to have some influence on the
course of regional digital development, it is necessary to first contact the
municipality and politicians. Similarly, they acknowledged that cyberspace
per se cannot be completely controlled or constricted to local rules.
One participant  (a  politician) said that  at  the political  level,  citizens can
influence regional digital development by actively participating in political
meetings  and  discussions  at  the  local  and  national  levels.  Institutions
ensuring  personal  information  security,  such  as  the  Norwegian  Data
Protection Authority, have resulted from discussions at the civil society and
political levels.
The power civil society has to influence local development through social
media and online groups was also highlighted. To illustrate this, concrete
examples  were  given,  such  as  online  campaigns  with  high  local
engagement. These campaigns and online events later led to considerably
large offline demonstrations and meetings. For example, the preservation of
the  Alfheim  public  swimming  pool  and  building,  the  pride  parade  and
activities  related  to  LGBTQ  rights  and  the  Me  Too  movement  have
influenced decision makers.
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However,  it  was  noted that  online participation does  not  always lead to
offline  meetings  and  active  democratic  participation.  The  Tromsø-based
online group called No to Road Tolls had about 11,500 online members and
followers. However, only 20 people showed up to a demonstration in front
of the municipality.
Some participants further argued that digital development influences people
and not the other way around. Others added that such development happens
regardless of the local population’s wishes.
 3.3.2.6 Cybersecurity, security and trust
More than half of the participants felt that individuals were responsible for
learning how to use ICTs carefully so as to maintain security. It was stressed
that  a  person  must  have  awareness  of  the  risks  present  in  cyberspace.
Participants  regarded  Facebook  as  an  unsafe  platform,  commenting  on
hacked accounts and the amount of user information that the site stores and
sells. Particularly, the events linked to Cambridge Analytica their social and
political consequences were mentioned.
Participants felt that it was the responsibility of the government and local
and regional authorities to provide information and training to citizens to
improve their  digital  security.  This  could be  imparted  through public  or
private classes  at  workplaces  or  organizations.  The Swedish government
takes this responsibility seriously, and it mailed letters to citizens discussing
issues  concerning  societal  security  and  vulnerabilities,  resilience  and
cyber(in)security.
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Two participants emphasised that the private sector has the responsibility to
safeguard  people’s  information.  One  added  that  companies  operating  in
Norway  should  assume  greater  responsibility  than  they  currently  do
regarding the client information that they collect and keep.
In light of the changes brought by digitalisation, it was argued that the state
has an important  role in guarding the personal data of citizens and their
safety. For example, according to one participant:
It is the state that must keep us safe. If it cannot keep us safe, then it
is the same not to have it. This is the actual reason for what I pay
taxes  for…because  they  have  a  national  security  authority,  and
organisations such as the Norwegian Data Protection Authority. They
[the government] have resources that are used to create order and
implement the legislation and that can provide guidelines at all levels
and for private companies in Norway.
Finally, to enhance trust, it was suggested that the integration or widespread
use of digital solutions that render more effective and cost-efficient services
was positive but not enough. Respondents felt that it was also necessary to
involve the city’s inhabitants and hear about their needs and wishes.
 3.4 Digital development in small communities and 
organizations in northern Norway: a case study from 
the Lofoten islands.
We were interested in contributing to deepen the current understanding of
the perceived impact digitalisation has  had in  civil  society organizations
located within small  communities,  and how these communities and their
civil society organizations experience such changes.
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For  our study,  we chose  the  Lofoten archipelago,  considered one  of  the
world’s northernmost populated regions,  located in the Arctic Circle and
belonging to the county of Nordland, Norway. Nature-wise, the islands are
known for their beauty and dramatic mountains and peaks. Fieldwork took
place in Svolvær and in the villages and towns of Kabelvåg, Henningsvær
and Leknes. During fieldwork visits carried in the spring of 2018 and the
autumn of 2019,  eight  formal  interviews were  conducted  and two small
semi-structured ‘citizen cafés’ took place, as well as formal and informal
conversations with local inhabitants.
The  voluntary  organizations  that  were  formally  interviewed  include
humanitarian organizations, political organizations, nature or environmental
protection  organizations,  hobby  organizations  and  an  organization
coordinating  volunteering  work  in  the  region.  Some  preliminary
observations  from  the  field  are  presented  below,  as  beneficial  and
constraining effects brought by the digital development in the area.
Enablements  brought  by  digitalisation,  according  to  citizens  and
organizations  participating  in  the  study  include:  a)  search  and  rescue
operations partially benefited upon the implementation of digital services b)
ability  to  easily  connect  with  other  organizations,  individuals  and
communities  despite  remoteness  or  vast  geographical  distances,  c)  local
organizations  gained  increased  support  nationally  and  internationally  to
promote their environmental and political agendas,  c) greater educational
opportunities were facilitated by online education, d)  efficiency and cost
reduction at  organizations was enhanced, e) the local  economy benefited
due to increasing tourism and higher demand of Airbnb accommodations
and local services, f) communication with local authorities was enhanced.
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Main  constraints  identified  by  citizens  and  organizations  include:  a)
Increased tourism in the Lofoten archipelago, as a result of Instagram and
Facebook posts,  has  caused that  important  natural  areas  are damaged or
affected by littering,  b) death and accidents in the local  mountains were
reported to be linked to tourists’ search for the ‘perfect selfie’ or picture c)
search  and  rescue  operations  in  the  mountains  and  high  peaks  have
increased due to a greater flow of tourists, d) cyber-hate, surveillance and
everyday  cyber-(in)  security  issues  were  reported  by  organizations  and
citizens,  e) a great number of services have been completely digitalized,
some  of  them  against  the  wishes  of  individuals  (physical  banks  have
disappeared, ATMs, fewer postal  service points present,  etc.),  f)  a sector
taking part in the local economy was affected, such as the hotel branch and
small businesses, as Airbnb and online shopping are on high demand.
Among the changes brought by digitalisation, it is particular to the area that,
in the perception of many participants,  tourism was greatly enhanced by
social  media.  Pictures  and  posts  shared  in  Instagram  and  Facebook,
highlighting the exotic  and beautiful  nature in the Lofoten islands,  were
seen as a main factor that caused more tourists to visit the area. As reported
by individuals, local help groups and search and rescue organizations, this
resulted in damage to the natural landscape and littering and contamination.
These and other listed empirical  findings, to be explored in-depth in our
coming article, throw light on the positive, negative and challenging sides
of  digitalisation,  experienced  by  citizens  and  civil  society  organizations
embedded in small communities.
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 3.5 Preliminary conclusions
We believe that our research may be used as a starting point to illustrate and
analyse some of the changes that civil society in the Norwegian High North
has experienced due to the use, development and integration of ICTs. The
implications  of  such  changes  may  then  be  regionally  compared  and
analysed. By shedding light on the constraints and benefits that cyberspace
and ICTs have had on individuals, communities and organisations, further
recommendations can be provided as to how to mitigate the negative effects
and enhance the positive ones.
For instance,  due to the digitalisation of services,  citizens and organised
civil society may become particularly vulnerable in instances of internet and
ICT service disruptions. This is particularly true if there is limited technical
resiliency and a lack of alternative ways to continue to operate and benefit
from these services. It should also be noted that issues connected to privacy
or  data  protection,  cybercrime and increased  societal  vulnerability  occur
more frequently today. Thus, we hope our research can suggest  ways to
mitigate or prevent unwanted consequences that may hinder civil society in
Northern Norway.
Our findings show that cyberspace has not profoundly changed society in
terms of  the relative power that  one type of civil  society can have over
another. Digitalisation itself has neither democratized nor undemocratized
societies  (including  the  Norwegian  society)  by  changing  the  balance
between  different  types  of  civil  society  modes  or  altering  the  essential
characteristics of society-state relations. Our results do not adhere to the
idea of giving cyberspace the status of ‘agency’ in its own right.
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Digitalisation  appears,  however,  to  have  had  a  transformative,  generally
positive  impact  in  the  way  communication  happens  between  local
communities  and  civil  society  organizations  in  northern  Norway.
Geographical  distances  were  much  less  constraining  when  instant
communication and coordination in cyberspace happened, also influencing
the  transnational  level  as  well  as  communication  with  local  authorities.
Similarly,  the  rendering  of  different  services  (now  digital)  and  their
effectivity was seen as positive.
Another preliminary finding strongly suggests that the digital development,
despite being praised by some for bringing increased effectivity in services
and cost-reduction, has constraining effects. As expressed by several civil
society organizations and citizens in Tromsø Lofoten,  local  communities
appear, to some extent, to have been significantly and negatively impacted
by the digital development. These findings may suggest the need for new
strategies to cope with this kind of unwanted development.
At the citizen level, some of our findings point out that citizens experience
enhanced, everyday cyber insecurity and wish for more effective ways to
reduce or prevent them. Combined efforts from citizens, local and national
authorities have been suggested by citizens and local authorities themselves
to safeguard their personal data and to prevent fake news or other possible
adverse effects on democracy.
By closely working and interacting with local  civil  society organisations
and individuals, our work has sought to integrate local perspectives into the
analysis of digital developments in the EHN. Building on our previous data
and the proposed framework of analysis, our work will be expanded and
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continued. We can then further discuss the implications our findings may
have  for  civil  society  and  issues  such  as  democratic  participation  and
transnational cooperation.
 3.6 Follow Up
The civil society framework outlined in Section 2 will be followed up with
a  more  empirical,  quantitative,  survey-based  and  indicator-based  peer
reviewed journal  article,  which is currently in  progress.  Over 6000 non-
governmental  organisations  registered  in  Northern  Norway  (Troms  and
Finnmark  regions)  will  be  the  empirical  focus  of  that  article.  Empirical
findings from the case study in the Lofoten islands will complement our
study.  The  information  from  the  World  Café  experiment  discussed  in
Section 3 will be used in a comparative article of Finnish and Norwegian
experiences.
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Executive Summary
Digitalisation  is  rapidly  changing  the  availability  of  information  and
services online. This is accompanied by cutbacks to physical services in an
attempt  to  save  costs  and  increase  efficiency.  Digital  skills  have  thus
become critical to accessing and benefiting from developments in the digital
age.  This  may  have  implications  for  social  inclusion  in  geographically
peripheral and sparsely populated areas such as the European High North
(EHN).  To  address  this,  we  used  a  modified  framework  of  human  and
cybersecurity. Analysis of our fieldwork data indicated that this framework
supports some of the key insights in the literature on digital divides in rural
areas. Firstly, digitalisation is seen as highly beneficial to the EHN because
it  enables  people to live,  study and work in  peripheral areas.  Secondly,
people  distinguish  between  different  uses  of  information  and
communication technologies (ICTs). Some services, such as online banking,
are  perceived  as  more  beneficial  but  also  more  complex  than  others.
Thirdly, younger family members are an important resource to many elderly
people when using digital  technologies.  Lastly,  not  all  services  are fully
accessible, especially for people with visual impairments. Additionally, the
provision of services in Sámi languages is often not prioritised. Overall, our
findings show that digitalisation provides new solutions and opportunities
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that  are  crucial  in  remote  areas  like  the  EHN.  However,  unless  its
limitations  are  seriously  considered,  sections  of  the  population  may  be
excluded from its full benefits.
 4.1 Introduction
Our  research  explores  the  relationship  between  digitalisation  and  social
inclusion/exclusion in the European High North (EHN).  Specifically,  we
examine social exclusion from the perspective of human security, arguing
that this should be incorporated into a broader conception of cybersecurity.
This means that the enabling and constraining aspects of digitalisation and
digital  technologies  can  be  considered  at  the  individual  and  community
level in terms of protecting citizens’ freedoms from fear and want. In order
to  gather  primary  data  for  our  case  studies,  we  conducted  fieldwork  in
northern  Finland  and  Norway.  Both  field  trips  involved  semi-structured
interviews with key informants in the region. The qualitative data generated
by the interviews support some of the key insights in the literature on digital
divides in rural areas. 
 4.2 Theoretical framework
Our  theoretical  framework  bridges  the  literatures  on  security  and  social
exclusion,  showing  how  exclusion  can  be  thought  of  as  an  element  of
human security and why the security of individuals and communities should
be integrated into the wider cybersecurity debate. We briefly define these
concepts below and integrate them into a single research framework, which
is then applied to the EHN case study.
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 4.2.1 Security
Traditional approaches to security within international relations focussed on
military threats to sovereign states (Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau, 1973;
Waltz, 1979). This narrow understanding of security was proposed in the
1980s during the post-Cold War period due to the emergence of a broader
security  agenda  encapsulating  additional  sectors,  such  as  environmental,
economic and societal security (Barnett, 2001; Buzan, 1991; Buzan, Wæver,
& de Wilde, 1998; McSweeney, 1999). This transition from a state-centric
and  military  focussed  understanding  was  reinforced  by  the  subsequent
emergence of critical security approaches (Booth, 2007; Holland & Jarvis,
2015; Sheehan, 2005; Wyn Jones, 2007) and by the adoption of a human
security  approach  by  the  United  Nations  Development  Program (1994).
These  developments  made  it  possible  to  address  security  not  simply  in
terms of additional sectors but, crucially, to focus on the individual human
being or sub-state communities as the referent object (Booth, 2005, p. 22).
 4.2.2 Cybersecurity
When the concept of cybersecurity emerged, this too was initially narrow in
scope,  focussing  on  the  identification  and  protection  of  critical
infrastructures. The human being was generally excluded from the pool of
potential referent objects and had the status of the weakest link, threat or
victim (Dunn Cavelty, 2014, pp. 703–704). By shifting the referent object of
cybersecurity  to  the  human  being,  it  became  possible  to  analyse
cybersecurity not simply in terms of the problematic dimensions of human
cyber use but in terms of its enabling and constraining effects.
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 4.2.3 Human security
The 2003 report  by the Commission on Human Security  defined human
security as:
The protection  of  the  vital  core  of  all  human lives  in  ways  that
enhance  human  freedoms  and  human  fulfilment  …  [including]
processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means
creating  political,  social,  environmental,  economic,  military  and
cultural  systems that  together  give  people  the  building  blocks  of
survival, livelihood and dignity (p. 4).
Creating a framework for human cybersecurity requires a brief unpacking of
the concept of freedom. In human security,  freedom from fear and want
corresponds to the notions of negative and positive freedoms (Alkire, 2003).
As such, freedom from fear is concerned with survival and is protected by
civil  and  political  rights.  In  the  digital  world,  therefore,  threats  to  the
freedom from fear  component of  human cybersecurity include threats  to
privacy and freedom of expression as well as theft and fraud. Subsequently,
freedom from want is concerned with livelihood and dignity and is realised
through economic, social and cultural rights. In the digital world, this covers
issues such as economic and educational opportunities as well as access to
services. Defined this way, the concept of human security embraces many
of the dimensions prominent in the social exclusion literature.  From this
view, human security can be considered ‘a comprehensive approach that
integrates  the  notion  of  social  exclusion  and  links  it  to  an  extended
framework  that  includes  economic  security,  health,  education,  conflict,
governance and migration perspectives’ (Sokoloff & Lewis, 2005, p. 6).
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 4.2.4 Social exclusion
There is no generally accepted definition of social exclusion, but some of
the most widely used definitions have clear commonalities. Burchardt, Le
Grand and Piachaud (2002) argued that an individual is socially excluded if
they do not participate in key activities in the society in which they live,
though  this  is  a  rather  broad  definition.  Sen  (1999)  noted  that  social
exclusion may result from a lack of the capabilities required to participate in
the experiences that lead to social inclusion. Often, the concept is associated
with explicit citizenship rights (Berghman as cited in Noll, 2002, p. 56).
Levitas et al. (2007) offered the following definition:
Social  exclusion  is  a  complex  and  multi-dimensional  process.  It
involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services,
and  the  inability  to  participate  in  the  normal  relationships  and
activities, available to the majority of people in society, whether in
economic,  social,  cultural  or  political  arenas.  It  affects  both  the
quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society
as a whole (p. 9).
Byrne (1999) also emphasised the deprivation of social goods as a form of
exclusion.  There  are  thus  clear  similarities  between the  social  exclusion
concept and the prominent criteria in various definitions of human security.
Restricted access to opportunities and limited capabilities to capitalise on
these,  along  with  reference  to  the  social  and  economic  dimensions  of
exclusion, seem to characterise most of the above definitions. Thus, social
exclusion is more than material deprivation. Rather, it is the relative lack of
economic, social and cultural capital required to realise human freedoms.
Social  exclusion therefore  hinders  freedom from fear  and freedom from
want  and  as  a  consequence  constrains  the  individual’s  or  community’s
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ability to access and capitalise on opportunities and achieve security. Below,
we clarify what this means from a human cyber perspective.
 4.2.5 Measuring social exclusion
When  studying  social  exclusion,  it  is  useful  to  view  it  through  a
constructivist  lens.  This  highlights  that  the  concept  is  highly  normative;
many definitions of social exclusion refer to exclusion from activities that
are normal or available to the average or majority of citizens. Because of the
relative and normative nature of social exclusion, there is reason to question
some of the quantitative indicators often used to measure it. For example,
van  Regenmortel  et  al.  (2016,  pp.  333–334)  argued  that  the
operationalisation  of  social  exclusion  varies  between  cases,  as  the
experience of social exclusion is context dependent. A universal measure of
social exclusion variables will not be appropriate or applicable in all cases,
which is the case with existing research on social exclusion and the elderly.
For example, labour market participation among older people who receive
old age pensions can differ from country to country. Continuing to work
after pension age may signify financial stress, but for others, it may be a
result  of  high work  satisfaction.  Thus,  labour  market  participation as  an
indicator of social exclusion ignores the motivation behind the participation.
By emphasising agency, the notion of social exclusion can be problematised
further. For example, a study that took place in rural Northern Finland found
that youth narratives contradicted and contested the dominant discourse of
social exclusion. They emphasised that people choose to live there and can
experience  life  satisfaction  differently.  The  young  people  in  the  study
wanted  the  researchers  to  recognise  that  ‘staying  in  a  rural  village  can
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indicate  a  successful  life’  (Lanas,  Rautio,  &  Syrjala,  2013,  p.  393).
Similarly, a growing body of literature on elderly people’s relationship to
digital technologies has shown that motivation might be one of the most
important reasons for little or no use (Dahlberg, 2012; Lüders & Brandtzæg,
2016; 2017; Slettemeås, 2014). Older people may not feel the need to use
digital technologies, or they may choose to prioritise other activities. In this
view, choosing not to engage with digital technology is not necessarily a
sign of social exclusion but may instead be a deliberate choice about how to
spend one’s life and how to achieve individual wellbeing. Thus, while self-
exclusion  from opportunities  only  available  through  the  use  of  ICTs  or
proximity to an urban area may lead to some forms of objective material
deprivation,  they  do  not  necessarily  lead  to  feeling  socially  excluded.
However, as Reneland-Forsman (2018, p. 335) pointed out, the notion of
agency is a difficult  one from a structural  point of view, ‘as “choice” is
clearly embedded within a social context and expectations that will shape
what is often referred to as “choices”’.
 4.2.6 Digital divides
During  the  1990s,  a  new  dimension  of  social  exclusion  began  to  be
discussed; this idea of social exclusion resulted from limited access to ICTs
and is referred to as the digital divide. The divide is understood in terms of
access  to  and  usage  of  digital  technologies,  or  a  divide  between  the
information poor and information rich (Wresch, 1996). It is an example of
social exclusion because ‘digital exclusion involves the unequal access and
capacity to use … [ICTs] that are seen as essential to fully participate in
society’ (Hope, Martin & Zubairi, 2016, p. 2). Today, the field has moved
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from the exclusively access-based digital divide research to a greater focus
on variations  in  skills  and  usage  (Scheerder,  van  Deursen,  & van  Dijk,
2017).
As argued above, there is a clear component of relativity and self-perception
in how social exclusion is experienced. This extends to digital exclusion as
well;  Helsper  (2017)  therefore  adopted  a  relative  deprivation  model  to
digital  inequality.  She  suggested  that  an  individual  may  be  relatively
deprived  in  the  objective sense  but  may not  experience  subjective (self-
perceived)  relative  deprivation.  If  a  person  sees  no  value  in  digital
technology, does not expect to adopt it in the future and does not have the
abilities  needed to use  it,  they might  not  feel  like they are at  an unjust
disadvantage. This could help to explain why 71% of Norwegian elderly
non-users feel that they cope just fine in their everyday lives (Slettemeås,
2014, p. 74).
As  with  social  exclusion,  digital  exclusion/inclusion  is  mediated  by  an
individual’s economic, cultural and social capital. Selwyn (2004) therefore
used the term technological  capital, which includes aspects of traditional
capital  (Bourdieu, 1986) but also highlights their relevance to the digital
world. Thus, economic capital includes the ‘economic capacity to purchase
ICT hardware and software’,  cultural  capital  is  the ‘participation in  ICT
education  and  training’  and  social  capital  encompasses  ‘networks  of
“technological  contacts”  and  support’  (Selwyn,  2004,  p.  355).  The
technological capital of an individual influences their digital access on all
levels (motivation, access, skills and usage), producing unequal outcomes
which  have  implications  for  social  exclusion  (see  Figure  1).  Digital
outcomes that enable participation and enhance capital can facilitate social
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inclusion,  whereas  digital  processes  which  essentially  reproduce  offline
inequalities constrain human opportunity and security.
Figure 1. Levels of ICT access and its relationship to offline circumstances (van Dijk, 2005).
 4.3 Case study: Elderly in the EHN
 4.3.1 Background
The  peripheral  geographical  location  of  the  EHN  represents  several
challenges  and  the  potential  for  cumulative  disadvantages.  Its  remote
location  (in  comparison  to  its  populated  southern  centres)  and  long
distances mean that restricted or missing mobility can become a barrier to
opportunities in general and to community inclusion specifically (Kenyon,
Lyons,  &  Rafferty,  2002;  Kilpeläinen  &  Seppänen,  2014).  As  physical
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public services are withdrawn, those who cannot or will not engage online
are  at  a  greater  risk  of  exclusion  (Hodge,  Carson,  Carson,  Newman,  &
Garrett, 2017; Warren, 2007). Inequality of access in terms of bandwidth,
technology and literacy is a  persistent  problem across  the Arctic  (Arctic
Council,  2016),  yet  the  Nordics  are  generally  high  scoring  in  terms  of
digitalisation  statistics.  Moreover,  the  Norwegian,  Swedish  and  Finnish
national  and  local  governments  have  adopted  strategies  to  improve
broadband  coverage  (Eskelinen,  Frank,  &  Hirvonen,  2008;  Norwegian
Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2016; Randall, Berlina,
Teräs, & Rinne, 2018), but the general trend shows an increasing gap in
digital  infrastructure  quality  between  commercially  profitable  (mainly
urban) and unprofitable (remote) areas due to the catch-up effect (Salemink,
Strijker,  &  Bosworth,  2017).  The  issue  of  poor  internet  speed  is  not  a
problem  limited  to  the  EHN,  however  (Statistics  Norway,  2017a).  It  is
therefore important not to overstate infrastructure problems. Yet, as the rural
social exclusion literature suggests, rural populations are at a disadvantage
because  of  long  distances,  sparse  populations  and  lack  of  proximity  to
public  services.  Warren (2007) argued that  because of  this,  the potential
benefits of being connected are high in rural areas, as are the disadvantages
of non-use.  As public  services  become more difficult  to  access,  internet
connectivity (as well as competency) becomes more important for gaining
the benefits of the ongoing digitalisation process. 
 4.3.2 The elderly
Elderly people are considered to be vulnerable to social exclusion and to
suffering from multiple disadvantages (van Regenmortel et al., 2016). They
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are also thought to be the most vulnerable to digital exclusion because they
constitute the majority of non-users and weak users (Slettemeås, 2014). For
elderly people facing multiple disadvantages (such as geographical location,
mobility issues,  poor health,  old age and shrinking social  networks),  the
total  sum of experienced  barriers  to  societal  participation may lead to  a
higher  risk  of  social  exclusion.  It  is  not  clear  whether  digitalisation
increases  or  reduces  this  risk.  On the  one hand,  it  is  hoped that  digital
technologies can lessen the demographic pressures on welfare services as
well  as  reduce  the  risk  of  social  exclusion,  but  on  the  other  hand,
digitalisation has the potential to create unintended exclusion for weak or
non-users. 
 4.3.3 Digital access
As outlined above, varied access to ICTs can be viewed in terms of different
stages, as proposed by van Dijk (2005, p. 22). In Figure 1, we chose to
illustrate this as a circle to highlight its effect in terms of producing and
reproducing  the  preconditions  for  access.  This  model  demonstrates  that
access consists of motivation, physical accessibility, skills and forms of use.
Each  form of  access  has  implications  for  the  utilisation  of  ICTs  and  is
grounded  in  offline  circumstances.  This  section  evaluates  the  different
components  of  access  in  order  to  shed  light  on  the  question  of  what
problems elderly people face in their ICT use, from individual motivation
and physical access to ICT skills and types of usage. This literature review
serves  as  the  theoretical  starting  point  for  an  empirical  investigation  of
digital divides in the EHN.
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 4.3.3.1 Motivation
Motivation determines a person’s willingness to adopt and use ICTs (van
Dijk, 2005, p. 27). Studies have found that many elderly people are simply
not interested in using digital tools. For example, Slettemeås (2014, p. 69)
reported that  a  perceived lack of  need to  use the internet  and a lack of
interest in it are the two main reasons why elderly Norwegians choose not
to use the internet.  Furthermore, Dahlberg (2012, p.  14) found that  even
those who have used digital tools in the past may choose not to in old age
because their priorities change and digital participation is no longer seen as
important to their lifestyles. Lüders and Brandtzæg (2016, p. 1) also noted a
divergence in what they termed ‘cultures of communication’, reflecting a
generational gap wherein online communication is experienced or perceived
as less authentic. Some age groups, especially the elderly, might also feel
that they are too old to learn how to use a computer (Nøhr, 2006, p. 85). In
short, motivation is the first aspect of ICT use and necessarily affects the
level of engagement a person has with digital technology.
 4.3.3.2 Access
The next step to ICT use is material access. This aspect is closely associated
with the traditional  digital  divide literature,  which distinguished between
computer and internet  haves and have-nots (van Dijk,  2005, p.  45).  The
internet  access gap has to a large extent been closed in the Nordics and
other highly developed information societies (see European Commission,
2018), and compared to the rest of Europe, usage rates are higher in the
Nordics,  even  among  older  people  (Dahlberg,  2012,  p.  14).  While  the
elderly demographic is less likely to own a computer, gaps are being closed
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as new tech-savvy generations begin to age.  In  2014, 74% of elderly in
Norway reported  owning a  computer  with  internet  access  in  their  home
(Slettemeås,  2014,  p.  15).  However,  geographically,  there  are  some
remaining  urban-rural  gaps  in  infrastructure,  and  demographically  and
socio-economically, some sections of the population are disadvantaged in
terms of physical access to digital technologies. 
Another dimension of material access is accessibility, by which we mean
barriers to use stemming from disability. Users in this category may have
the  motivation,  basic  access  and  skills  to  use  digital  technologies  but
experience exclusion due to material barriers other than those previously
mentioned. According to Slettemeås (2014, p. 10), 14% of elderly internet
users with a disability feel that their disability hinders them from fully using
the internet and digital equipment, and 38% feel they gain extra benefits
from using the internet and digital services, showing that when accessible,
people benefit from its use. Despite legislation in this area, there is still a
lack of awareness about accessibility standards, and a study found that not
all commonly used e-health sites, which would be of particular benefit to
many groups, are fully accessible (Holthe, 2016, pp. 12–14).
However,  access  alone  does  not  eliminate  the  inequality  of  digital
opportunities (Tsatsou, 2011). Digital skills and how people use technology
matter.  Certain  usages  are  believed  to  have  more  benefits  than  others,
reflecting the widely reported ‘rich get  richer’ effect  (van Dijk,  2005, p.
126).
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 4.3.3.3 Competency
As more  aspects  of  life  are  digitalised  and more people  than ever  have
access to ICTs, digital skills are becoming necessary for full participation in
society.  Using  the  internet  has  in  fact  become a  critical  competency  in
Norway due to high levels of access and use (Staksrud, 2011). Likewise, in
Sweden there has been a ‘shift in rhetoric from “access” to citizens’ skilful
“use”  of  digital  resources’ in  government  agendas  (Reneland-Forsman,
2018, p. 336). Digital skills, which can be broadly divided into operational,
informational and strategic skills, are therefore an important part of the ICT
puzzle (van Dijk, 2005, p. 73).
Some early literature on digital  divides  adhered to  a  narrative  of  digital
natives and digital immigrants, in other words, those born in the digital age
and those who entered it as adults (Prensky, 2001). This suggests that young
people today acquired a high level of digital competency from a young age.
There is some truth to this. As Lüders and Brandtzæg (2016, p. 2) noted,
using  digital  media  technologies  requires  a  combination  of  cognitive,
sensory and motor skills as well as the knowledge of cultural and social
norms  and  practices  that  are  attached  to  these  technologies.  Reported
barriers  for  older  people  were  that  computer  language  is  difficult  to
understand (36%), they are dependent on guidance from others (23%) or
they are afraid of making mistakes (22%; Slettemeås, 2014, p. 10).
However, the development of digital skills and literacy is closely related to
existing  offline  skills  and  capital.  In  light  of  this,  the  digital
native/immigrant narrative is not as empirically valid as first thought. For
example, a recent study looked at the relationship between age, education
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level  and digital  experience/skills  (Fjørtoft,  2017).  An interesting finding
was that the relationship between age and digital skills was mitigated by
education level; among people in the 55–74 age group with a high level of
education, there was a larger proportion of people with good digital skills
(41%) than adults in the 35–54 age group with lower levels of education
(29%). This shows that people who are introduced to ICTs earlier in life do
not automatically acquire higher levels of digital skills; rather, their digital
competency reflects their overall educational resources. Thus, generational
divides alone do not explain the gap between digital natives and immigrants
(Helsper & Eynon, 2010). We must therefore avoid the simplification that
young people are automatically digitally competent and instead look at the
type of competency acquired.
Operational  skills  are  basic  digital  competencies  that  allow  the  user  to
utilise digital equipment. Some researchers have examined the digital skills
of elderly people from this perspective. For instance, Karahasanović et al.
(2009, p. 662) found that older people feel less comfortable than younger
people with tasks such as downloading software to their computers, creating
a webpage and programming; however, they found no significant difference
in  terms  of  age  regarding  the  use  of  text  editor  applications  and
spreadsheets. Similarly, of respondents in a different survey, 48% claimed to
need help from family or friends to buy digital equipment, 68% to install
software, 67% to choose settings on their device,  56% to connect digital
equipment, 63% to solve technical problems, 45% to download programmes
or apps and 50% to update virus protection (Slettemeås, 2014, p. 10).
As  society  becomes  more  digitalised,  higher  levels  of  technological
competence are becoming increasingly important to actualise citizens’ rights
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and reap  the  benefits  of  digitalisation.  These informational  and strategic
skills are a different set of competencies than strictly operational skills. This
is not a new problem but rather an issue of traditional information inequality
being applied to a new medium, ICTs (van Dijk, 2005). As a result, digital
inclusion/exclusion  is  closely  related  to  users’  offline  circumstances
(Helsper, 2012). Thus, we can hypothesise that some of the apparent skill
gaps between the young and elderly may be a result of different skillsets.
While children today might have a high level of operational skills from a
young age, this should not be mistaken for a higher level informational and
strategic competency.
Lastly, digital skills are often thought of as individual attributes. The reality
is that users, especially elderly people, rely on their networks of friends and
family to navigate the digital world (Rasi & Kilpeläinen, 2015). These so-
called proxy users may be family members or caregivers, and they often
perform  formal  online  tasks  for  people  who  cannot  do  so  themselves
(Selwyn, Johnson, Nemorin, & Knight, 2016). Thus, despite computer and
internet  use  being  widespread  in  Norway  compared  to  the  EU average,
many elderly are dependent upon family and friends to undertake tasks such
as buying products online, setting up and installing equipment and software,
troubleshooting  issues  and  choosing  the  right  settings  (Dahlberg,  2012;
Slettemeås, 2014; Statistics Norway, 2017b). This also has implications for
the  uses  of  welfare  technologies  or  telecare  equipment  such  as  sensors,
pendant alarms and GPS tracking devices, as elderly people often rely on
their support  networks in order to incorporate these technologies in their
daily life (Koivunen, 2014). As we have shown, there are different types of
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ICT-related skillsets that a person can have or acquire through their social
network. These skills affect how a person makes use of digital technologies.
 4.3.3.4 ICT Use
Use refers  to the type of  usage that  is  made of  digital  technologies,  for
instance,  whether  a  person  uses  simple  or  advanced  applications  for
entertainment, communication, information and so on (van Dijk, 2005, p.
95). This is closely related to competency, and both are considered second-
level digital divides (Scheerder et al., 2017).
Slettemeås  (2014,  p.  52)  found  that  common  reasons  among  elderly
respondents  for  using  the  internet  were  staying  updated  and  informed
(73%), using services from home (65%), staying in touch with family and
friends (45%), for work (28%) and for entertainment (21%). More recent
data show that among Norwegian internet users aged 67 to 79, 67% use e-
mail, 6% read a blog, 48% use Facebook, 12% use other social media sites,
51%  search  for  information,  24%  look  at  advertisements,  24%  find
information about restaurants or events, 48% use online banking, 7% buy
tickets for travel, 2% shop online, 13% use public services, 11% use other
services and 10% watch television or  videos on an average day (Vaage,
2017, pp. 66–67). Elderly people also use digital media to mobilise support
and maintain existing relationships (Quan-Haase, Mo, & Wellman, 2017).
Some of the positive aspects of technology mentioned by elderly people
were  its  usefulness,  convenience  and  supportiveness,  for  example,  by
allowing  them  to  maintain  independence  and  making  their  lives  easier
(Mitzner et al., 2010).
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The examples above only illustrate the surface of the usage issue because in
reality, access does not equate to use and use does not equate to meaningful
engagement. This leads to ‘inequalities of outcome’ in the short and long
term in terms of social  inclusion (Selwyn, 2004, p.  351).  A study in the
Netherlands found that people with low levels of education used the internet
more  than  those  with  higher  levels  of  education;  however,  people  with
higher educational levels used the internet for more “objectively” beneficial
purposes (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2014). Thus, the researchers argued, the
internet and how we use it increasingly come to reflect offline inequalities
and  can  potentially  contribute  to  exacerbating  exclusion.  A more  recent
study on this connection found that the level of education as well as income
can predict the internet skills of elderly people, with higher levels making
them  more  likely  to  undertake  more  beneficial  (defined  as  capital-
enhancing) activities online (Hargittai & Dobransky, 2017).
The  risk,  according  to  Winterberg  (2012,  p.  27),  is  that  two  classes  of
elderly emerge based on their ability to use computers and the internet. This
creates a situation wherein those who have the motivation, access and skills
benefit from being able to capitalise on digital opportunities, whereas those
who do not are at risk of increased dependence, isolation and lack of access
to beneficial information and services. What, then, are the actual outcomes
of  differentiated  access,  skills  and  use?  While  the  divide  between  first
(access) and second (skills and use) levels have received much attention,
Scheerder et al. (2017) argued that further research is needed on third-level
digital divides (outcomes) and their implications for social inequalities.
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 4.4 Fieldwork and findings
In  order  to  gather  primary  data  about  the  consequences  of  differing
motivations, access, skills and use among elderly populations in the EHN,
we conducted two fieldwork trips. The first trip was made in May 2018 to
Inari  and  Rovaniemi  in  northern  Finland.  A second  trip  was  made  to
Kirkenes in northern Norway in September 2018. Both field trips involved
interviews with key informants in the region who were selected because
they represented key digitalisation stakeholders in the areas  visited.  This
included a variety of people (n = 16) working in social  and health care,
municipal  offices  and  non-governmental  organisations,  including
organisations representing the elderly, indigenous people and people with
disabilities.  The  interviews  were  qualitative  and  semi-structured.  This
allowed for the interviewees to discuss topics important to them in depth
while  still  broadly  covering  the  same  range  of  questions  in  all  the
interviews. This was important for analysing the interview data later. The
interviews  were  all  transcribed  and  later  coded  by  theme  using  an
interpretive methodology. In the case of the Norwegian interviews, which
were conducted in Norwegian, the interviews were translated after the first
round  of  analysis  in  order  to  stay  as  close  to  the  original  meaning  as
possible.  The  Finnish  interviews  were  conducted  in  English  with  the
exception  of  one,  for  which  an  interpreter  was  present  to  facilitate  the
interview.
In  the  analysis  of  the  interview  data  from  the  fieldwork  trips,  some
important themes emerged:
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 Respondents resisted the dichotomy of digital natives and 
immigrants. They pointed out that not all elderly are sceptical of 
digital technologies and that digital literacy varies among all age 
groups. Personal interest and engagement matter.
 There was a feeling that digitalisation benefits peripheral areas 
more than urban centres. It has been described as an equaliser, and 
respondents referred to a number of examples of how digital 
technologies have enabled them to live, study and work in the 
periphery.
 Perceived usefulness was important for participants’ decision to 
adopt a digital technology.
 Lack of infrastructure and poor broadband access were only 
experienced in certain areas. In most places, respondents were 
perfectly happy about their internet coverage. However, the 
remaining unconnected areas will be very expensive to provide 
access to.
 Accessibility for people with disabilities, especially visual 
impairments, is still a challenge. Providing services in Sámi 
languages has also been under-prioritised.
 Respondents confirmed that younger family members are an 
important resource to elderly people when using digital 
technologies. Sometimes, this involved buying and setting up 
equipment. Other times, it required the elderly family members to 
relinquish control over their finances so that a family member 
could access online banking in their name. Banks recognise this 
and will sometimes ask elderly people whether they have a family 
member who can help them with certain tasks.
 Welfare technologies can enable independence and allow people to
live at home for longer. However, not all respondents agreed that 
this was desirable, and some viewed it as a reflection of the 
underfunding of welfare services. A related concern was less 
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physical contact in health and social care as a result of 
digitalisation.
 Respondents made distinctions between types of use. For example,
they pointed out that many elderly people use social media sites 
such as Facebook but have not learned how to use online banking 
and struggle to access their municipality’s online services.
 4.5 Conclusion
By  elucidating  the  relationship  between  the  concepts  of  cybersecurity,
human  security  and  social  exclusion,  we  have  highlighted  how  social
exclusion  can  be  incorporated  into  a  broader  conception  of  human
cybersecurity. This conceptualisation allows us to analyse the enabling and
constraining  aspects  of  digitalisation  and  digital  technologies  at  the
individual and community levels in terms of security of freedom from fear
and want. Through our review of the literature, we showed how, in addition
to referring to more than material deprivation, social exclusion is a highly
normative and relative concept.  As such,  there is  a  high degree  of  self-
perception involved in how social exclusion is experienced. This is also the
case  for  digital  forms  of  exclusion.  By  exploring  access  to  digital
technologies  through  van  Dijk’s  (2005)  multi-level  framework,  we
illustrated  how access  –  from motivation  and  physical  access  to  digital
competency  and  beneficial  use  –  is  mediated  by  an  individual’s
technological capital (Selwyn, 2004). This alerts us to how certain digital
outcomes can facilitate social inclusion, while other processes contribute to
reproducing  offline  inequalities,  thereby  constraining  human  opportunity
and security.
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The elderly  provide  a  pertinent  case  study of  digitalisation  in  the  EHN
because they are seen as a group that is particularly vulnerable to exclusion.
Together with the disadvantages associated with the peripheral geography
of the EHN, there is a concern that weak and non-ICT users, who are often
elderly, may not be able to make use of the opportunities provided by digital
services. As such, there is simultaneously a hope that digital technologies
can provide new and effective solutions and a concern that  digitalisation
may create exclusion where it otherwise would not exist.
Our  findings  point  in  this  direction.  Firstly,  there  is  a  recognition  that
digitalisation  highly  benefits  peripheral  areas  such  as  the  EHN.  Some
participants described the internet as an equaliser and gave examples of how
digital  technologies  enable  people  to  live,  study  and  work  in  the  EHN,
reflecting  the  broader  literature  on  digitalisation  in  rural  areas  (Warren,
2007). This, however, presupposes that everyone wants, can access and is
able to use ICTs to the extent that is demanded by the public and private
sector.
Secondly,  interviewees made distinctions between different  types of  ICT
use, which have also been noted in the literature (Hargittai & Dobransky,
2017; Selwyn,  2004).  For example,  many elderly competently use social
media  platforms  like  Facebook  but  struggle  to  use  services  that  are
perceived  to  be  more  complex  or  risky,  such  as  online  banking  and
municipal  online  services.  This  may  indicate  that  certain  groups  are
excluded from what some consider the most beneficial uses of ICTs, instead
having to pay user fees or travel long distances to continue using non-digital
alternatives.
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Thirdly,  younger  family  members  (along  with  competent  spouses  and
trusted friends)  are an important  resource for  many elderly people when
using digital technologies. Sometimes, this involves the more experienced
family member buying and setting up equipment. Other times, it requires
elderly individuals to relinquish control over their own finances so that a
family member can access  online banking in their  name.  Having family
members act as proxy users is not an uncommon practice (Selwyn et al.,
2016).
Lastly,  we  found  that  universal  design  requires  further  improvement
regarding  the  accessibility  of  digital  services,  especially  for  people  with
visual impairments. The broader literature shows that despite legislation in
this  area,  there  is  still  a  lack  of  awareness  about  accessibility  standards
(Holthe,  2016).  Another barrier to use is  that  providing services in Sámi
languages is often not prioritised. Our interviews revealed that under some
circumstances,  these  barriers  can  lead  to  compound  disadvantages.  To
conclude, our findings show that while digitalisation provides new solutions
and opportunities that are crucial for areas like the EHN and are largely
welcomed, the benefits of these developments will be unevenly distributed
if its limitations are not taken into account.
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Executive Summary
This chapter establishes the interconnection between existing environmental
global governance systems and cyberspace/cybersecurity as well as the first
ever parallel between the environmental (liability) regime and the nascent
cybersecurity  regime.  Understanding  the  interconnections  between  these
and the role of  law,  policies  and practices  in  the European High North
(EHN)  is  critical  to  understanding  the  variables  affecting  both  climate
change  and  cyberspace.  Although  climate  change  and  cyberspace  are
different  phenomena,  the  risks  associated  with  both  of  them  are
anthropogenic  and  can  affect  the  same  critical  equities,  including  key
sectors such as water, food and energy infrastructures. The aim of this study
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is  to  better  grasp  the  development  of  cyberspace  and  its  revolutionary
impact on human behaviour and human security.  This chapter  examines
and addresses  four core  ideas:  (1)  the linkage between climate change,
environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  in  the  EHN;  (2)  how  the
interconnectedness  of  environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  can  be
identified,  managed  and  regulated,  including  aspects  of  governance  for
cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the EHN; (3) how cyberthreats and
their  related  risk  assessments  can  be  incorporated  into  regulatory
frameworks  in  order  to  create  proactive  rather  than  reactive  law  by
exploring which is the best regulatory framework (or possible combination)
applicable among different areas of law; and (4) the current cyberthreats,
for  example,  in  the  energy  industry  and  specifically  to  critical
infrastructures (CIs) of the energy system, which will advise on the need to
design a future agreement incorporating the notion of human security.
 5.1 Introduction
This chapter  analyses  the interconnection between global climate change
and cyberspace by showing links and similarities between the two spheres
and establishing for the first time a parallel between selected focal points of
the environmental regime (in particular the environmental liability regime)
and the nascent  cybersecurity  regime.  Acknowledging and understanding
these interconnections is critical for devising policies and practices in the
European High North (EHN). This chapter examines the shared space of
similarities  between  environmental  regime  systems  (including  variables
affecting climate  change) and  cyberspace  frameworks.  Although the two
regimes are different, they are exposed to the same risks associated with
anthropogenic effects that might affect the same critical equities, including
key sectors such as water, food and energy infrastructures. 
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The present chapter investigates how the development of cyberspace, with
its  revolutionary  impact  on  human  behaviour  and  human  security,  is
contributing to social progress. By understanding the risks that come with
cyberspace,  we  can  secure  not  only  the  environment  but  also  human
activities and security. The latter, viewed in an untraditional way and in a
broader context at the global level, is not only confined to state security and
physical actions. It also includes environmental threats as a consequence of
climate change impacts. By showing how risks from human activities are
strictly interconnected with the use of cyberspace and related technologies,
this  chapter  demonstrates  the  need  to  couple  environmental  and
cybersecurity regulations in order to produce a joint regulatory response.
The development and use of digital products and services depends on the
functioning of  infrastructures,  which are under constant  stress from both
societal and environmental factors.
 5.2 Core guiding questions and responses
This chapter examines four core guiding questions:
1. Is there a linkage between climate change, environmental threats 
and cybersecurity in the EHN, and if so, what is the nature of this 
linkage?
2. How can the interconnectedness of environmental threats and 
cybersecurity be identified, managed and regulated, including 
aspects of governance for cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the 
EHN?
3. How can cyberthreats and their related risk assessments be 
incorporated into regulatory frameworks in order to create 
proactive rather than reactive law? Which is the best regulatory 
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framework (or possible combination) applicable among different 
possible areas and levels of regulations?
4. What are the current cyberthreats, for example, in the energy 
industry and to critical infrastructures (CIs) of the energy system?
CIs and their protections against individuals, groups and foreign nations are
strictly intertwined with cybersecurity and the peace of cyberspace (Fidler,
2015). CIs are strictly dependent on cyberspace and are heavily digitalised,
especially in the case of the energy sector (oil, gas, electricity and nuclear),
which is more exposed to environmental climate conditions/threats as well
as cyberthreats. Cyberthreats and environmental threats interact with CIs in
a negative synergistic way and make CIs even more vulnerable to risks. CIs
in the energy sector are particularly at risk of cyberthreats and cyberattacks,
especially in the EHN countries, such as Norway, Sweden and Finland. It is
necessary to evaluate the risks of cyberattacks damaging CIs. 
There  is  no  precise  or  agreed  upon  definition  of  CIs,  with  definitions
varying between countries. The European Commission (2004, p. 3) defined
CIs as ‘physical  and information technology facilities,  networks, services
and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on
the  health,  safety,  security  or  economic  well-being  of  citizens  or  the
effective functioning of governments’. CIs in the energy system are linked
to  environmental  and  climate  change  threats,  such  as  rising  sea  levels,
which  also  pose  a  threat  to  people  living  in  coastal  areas.  Therefore,
environmental threats can affect not only the ecology of an area but also
human security (Cassotta,  S.,  Sidortsov, R.,  Pursiainen,  C.,  Goodsite,  E.,
Cyber threats, harsh environment and the European High North (EHN) in a
human security  and  multi-level  regulatory  dimension:  Which  framework
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applicable  to  critical  infrastructures  under  “exceptionally  critical
infrastructure conditions” (ECIC)? Beijing Law Review, 2019, 10.
This  chapter  addresses  four  key  questions  to  frame effective  regulations
regarding  the  interconnection  between  environmental  threats  and
cybersecurity  and  to  suggest  how  a  governance  response  should  be
structured to connect the two areas. The consequences of digital disruptions
reach  beyond  the  costs  associated  with  clean  ups,  repairs  and/or
replacements of affected CIs to include economic, social and environmental
disruptions.  Thus,  this  chapter  contributes  to  developing  strategies  for
mitigating the impact of cyber-threats on the EHN, thereby acknowledging
the existence of a connection between the two regimes. The integration of
the key sectors and factors as well as the application of the same principles
of  environmental  law  to  both  regimes  has  been  particularly  fruitful  in
understanding how to create a safe future for the EHN, which in turn will
promote human security.
From a  theoretical  perspective,  this  chapter  uses  and  combines different
parts of scientific literature drawn from theories of international regimes,
including studies on the role of international relation theories, international
law,  transnationalism,  theories  of  complex  interdependencies  and  global
environmental  politics.  These  research  streams  in  the  political  science
literature can prove helpful in addressing the core questions of this chapter.
This approach is based on Elinor Ostrom’s (2012) legal framework applied
to  cyberspace,  which  can  help  to  conceptualise  the  connection  between
cyberspace and environmental regimes. Through this method, institutional
analysis design and socio-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2012) complement
legal theories based on legal pluralism and polycentrism (Petersen & Zhale,
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Arnaud,  1995).  This  chapter  is  based on a theoretical  framework that  is
operationalised through the concept of exceptionally critical infrastructure
conditions (ECICs) and CIs in the energy system using a multilevel context
(global and regional) without neglecting the domestic dimension of sources
of law and policies in Norway and Sweden.
From a methodological perspective, this study uses process tracing; legal
analysis of both hard and soft law including legal acts, treaty provisions,
policy reports and diplomatic speeches; and comparative analysis between
different sources of law and policies analysed with a multilevel approach as
method  of  assessment.  In  addition,  the  approach  was  interdisciplinary,
combining law and political  science to  explore which international  legal
framework would be most applicable to addressing cyberthreats to CIs if
environmental  law  did  not  prove  useful.  An  example  is  the  case  of
cyberthreats  to CIs in the energy sector of the EHN, which inspired the
suggested regime formation processes to achieve effectiveness in terms of
environmental protection and security goal achievements
 5.3 Conceptualising and governing the linkage 
between environmental governance and 
cybersecurity
This chapter conceptualises the linkage between environmental governance
and cybersecurity by addressing the core guiding questions of this research.
The first two core questions address the linkage between climate change,
environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  in  the  EHN  and  how  the
interconnectedness  of  environmental  threats  and  cybersecurity  can  be
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identified,  managed  and  regulated.  These  questions  include  aspects  of
governance for cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the EHN. This research
was conducted based on 1) the concept of ECICs and the law in the EHN;
2)  the  nexus  between  climate  change,  environmental  threats  and
cyberthreats in a multi-regulatory, contextual, sustainable global approach
with Sweden as a case study; and 3) the  most appropriate framework for
addressing cyberthreats and the harsh environment in the EHN.
 5.3.1 Concept of ECICs and the law in the EHN
To our knowledge, no one in the field of cybersecurity and climate change
has  suggested  that  cybersecurity  is  an  important  tool  for  economic
development, but at the same time, the target of cyberthreats to CI, which in
the  Arctic  EHN  become  extra  critical  given  the  harsh  environmental
conditions  and  vast  distances.  Given  this  extra-criticality  due  to  the
environmental conditions, especially the impact of climate change (Cassotta
& Sidortsov, 2019), this chapter argues that CIs under ECICs are forged by
climate  change  (such  as  flooding;  rising  sea  levels;  and  interruption  of
maritime routes, electricity and communications), especially in the energy
sector  due  to  its  increased  exposure  to  environmental  threats  and  its
connection with major military and civilian installations. This chapter uses
Norway  as  an  example,  arguing  that  if  Norway’s  energy  assets  were
attacked  by  Russia  or  another  country,  if  its  communications  were
interrupted or if an oil spill occurred, these would be extra critical because
vessels would be put in distress,  communications jeopardised and rescue
operations made more difficult. This implies the need to create a plan at the
intersection between cyberspace and harsh environmental conditions. In this
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new way of thinking, the environment, cybersecurity and CIs interact with
social  and  human  security  determinants.  Cybersecurity  needs  to  be
reconceptualised  from a  green  perspective  that  links it  to  environmental
considerations to ensuring sustainability regarding both environmental and
human  security  issues  as  well  as  a  healthy,  stable  global  ecosystem
(Shackelford, 2016). CIs under ECICs need special legal protections due to
the cascading effect, which is an effect that increases dependencies among
CIs,  which  could  trigger  cascading  failures  and  multi-sectorial  collapses
(Van Eeten, 2011). Given that climate change is hitting the Arctic harder
than any other region of the world, and that the effects will be reflected in
the rest of our planet (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007),
the  significance  of  the  cascading  effect  is  amplified,  especially  for  the
category of events with low probability and high consequences. We found
that  although  it  is  possible  to  map  which  legislations  are  potentially
applicable for protecting CIs against cyberthreats,1 many researchers feel
that  the  applicable  legislations  are  fragmented  (Hathaway  et  al.,  2012;
Radzziwill, 2007; Schmitt, 2017; Tsoagourias & Buchan, 2016). Findings
from our study have shown that no treaties or regional agreements based on
sustainable protection of CIs under ECICs exist in the Arctic. Such a legal
framework is necessary because CIs in the Arctic are crucial for economic,
military and security issues and are strictly interconnected with the concept
of human security, as explained previously.
1 Legislation applicable to protection against cyberthreats include jus ad bellum laws (such
as the Law of Armed Conflict), the Charter of the United Nations, space law, laws of state
responsibility, international humanitarian laws, international criminal laws, international
laws applicable to terrorism, human rights laws, internet laws or the law of the sea (such
as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).
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These CIs host many data hubs, and significant energy resources depend on
digitalisation,  the  internet  and  computer  commands.  Disruptions  due  to
climate change impacts,  such as flooding, ice,  nuclear radiation or other
climate  disasters,  require  new  proactive  responses  and  methodologies.
Frequent  climate  changes  (storms,  cyclones,  rising  sea  levels,  water
scarcity,  drought,  heat  waves  and  warmer  temperatures)  can  threaten
nuclear power plants and their infrastructure. 
In  addition,  research has  shown that  sustainability  fails  when CIs  under
ECICs are not protected. Sustainable development is defined in the report
Our  Common  Future  (also  known  as  the  Brundtland  Report)  as
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission
on  Environment  and  Development,  1983).  International  practices  and
doctrines  on  sustainable  development  are  also  applicable  to  cyberspace
(Shackelford,  2016).  Important  principles  of  environmental  law  that  are
linked to the concept of sustainable development include the polluter-pays
principle, the precautionary principle and the principle of prevention. Both
the concept of sustainable development and environmental law principles
can  offer  research  areas  in  which  to  analyse  the  cybersecurity  of  CIs
exposed to climate conditions. The connection between sustainability and
cybersecurity is based on the need for social and economic progress and
sustainable development in civil society. 
In  the  management  of  cyberthreats,  both  the  public  and  private  sectors
should be involved in managing the interests of stakeholders. The private
sector is often faced with managing cyberthreats as part of an effort to build
trust with different groups through business activities such as joint ventures,
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mixed  agreement,  hybrid  business  practices  or  corporate  social
responsibility practices (Shackelford 2016). In this context, trust is defined
as confidence that a computer system will behave as expected. Cyberthreats
to CIs can be managed by utilising cybersecurity’s best available practices
and technologies while expanding internet access. Consensus standards are
often  necessary  to  harmonise  an  industry’s  best  practices,  for  example,
providing flexible and cost-effective approaches to enhancing cybersecurity
measures  that  assist  owners  and  operators  of  CIs  with  assessing  and
managing risks. In cases where sustainable business practices are equipped
to deal with issues of trust, cybersecurity and cyber peace can offer business
models on which to grow business practices. This chapter argues that CIs
under ECICs require a new paradigm of sustainable climate cybersecurity
that relies on the intention to protect CIs through environmental laws and
sustainability. Sustainability fails if the linkage between CIs and ECICs is
not governed through laws (Cassotta & Sidortsov, 2019).
 5.3.2 Nexus between climate change, environmental threats 
and cyberthreats in a multi-regulatory, contextual, sustainable 
global approach with Sweden as a case study
Studies  have been conducted with the precise aim of drawing a parallel
between  environmental  regulations,  the  cyberspace  and  cybersecurity
systems. Many aspects of the cybersecurity system are unknown and highly
fragmented (Hathaway, 2012; Radzziwill, 2007; Schmitt, 2017; Tsoagourias
& Buchan,  2016).  A study of  Swedish  cyber  strategy  in  relation  to  the
environmental regime is being conducted in order to better understand how
to improve the effectiveness of the complex cyber regime from a contextual
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perspective. One way to better understand cybersecurity systems is through
an interdisciplinary  study of  how best  to  coordinate  these  systems,  thus
making both cyber law and policy more effective. This study will provide
evidence on how to take inspiration from a regime system (environmental
law or, more concretely, the environmental liability framework) and use it
as a source of inspiration to understand and shape the formation of another
system in another area, namely cybersecurity.
The  methodology  consists  of  choosing  and  applying  key  aspects  of
environmental law (such as concepts and principles) and comparing them
with similar key aspects of cybersecurity. To make this comparison, multi-
level governance will be applied by analysing the sources of law and policy
existing at global, regional and national/local levels in order to understand
the interactions between these different levels.
The analytical task for this research consists of choosing focal points from
the environmental liability system that are similar and comparable to those
of  the  cyber  framework.  This  study  has  highlighted  the  difficulty  of
identifying  the  party  responsible  for  environmental  damage.  In  cases  of
diffuse pollution due to climate change effects, it is very difficult to identify
the potential polluter and cause of the damage. The same can be said for
cyber damages, as often it is impossible to identify the source of the cyber
threat. This study concentrates on three focal points: 1) Who is responsible?,
2)  How  is  risk  managed?  and  3)  How  is  international  cooperation
organised?  Other  issues,  such  as  liability,  leadership  and  insurance  (for
example, whether the cyber system is encountering the same difficulties as
the  environmental  system  when  it  comes  to  the  conceptualisation  of
insurance), has been treated.
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 5.3.3 Best framework for addressing cyberthreats and the 
harsh environment in the EHN
This study highlights that economic development opportunities in the EHN
are accompanied by the danger of cyberthreats, especially to CIs. Building
on this, this study will develop the concepts of ECIC and law in the EHN
from the previously discussed article (Section 4.3.2). This study will build
upon the previous concept of ECICs with the addition of new ideas;  for
example,  a  new condition of  extra criticality should also include human
security concerns to avoid human disasters.  CIs pertaining to the energy
sector are especially relevant in the EHN in terms of cyber threats since
these CIs are more exposed to environmental threats. This sector is in large
part  dependent  on digitalisation,  the internet  and demands of  computers.
The  digitalisation  of  CIs  can  face  interference  from  cyberthreats  and
climatic  conditions,  such  as  ice  and  natural  disasters.  Thus,  new
methodologies of assessment and effective legal frameworks are needed to
protect these CIs. Through this, the concept of human security will evolve
from  merely  physical  security  based  on  concrete  impacts  to  virtual  or
intangible human security existing in cyberspace. This implies that society
must be protected by rules regulating these new kinds of human security
risks. Society’s growing dependence on CIs and systems has resulted in a
new  class  of  security  threats.  Because  cyberthreats  can  come  from
anywhere  in  the  world  and  their  sources  are  difficult  to  pinpoint,  an
examination of the CIs under ECICs requires a comprehensive analysis of
the  existing  sources  of  law and  policy  at  the  national  (including  local),
regional and international levels to observe how pluralistic systems of legal
and political sources could apply and interact with complementary legal and
95
non-legal tools. In this study, Norway represents the domestic level (which
includes  the  local  dimension),  the  European  Union  (EU)  represents  the
regional  level  and  several  selected  treaties  represent  the  international
level.The concept of ECICs is based on recent definitions of criticality in
Norway, especially those found in the recent Norwegian approach, which
consists of a collection of reports, laws and strategies (DSB, 2014, pp. 183-
202;  DSB,  2017;  Forsvarsdepartementet,  2016;  Kommunal-og
moderniseringsdepartement,  2015;  The  Ministry  of  Government
Administration,  Reform and Church  Affairs,  2013;  The Nordic  Page,  24
March 2015).
Norway represents  a  good case  study for  a  global-local  approach  and  a
possible  source  of  inspiration  for  future  agreements,  strategies  and
management of the Arctic areas of the EHN. Svalbard has been chosen as a
sub-case of the global-local approach, representing the local dimension. The
reason for adopting the Norwegian model is because this model takes into
account vulnerabilities and locations of CIs (particularly in relation to harsh
environmental conditions). Svalbard demonstrates that most of the potential
threats mentioned in the national  risk assessment are valid in the Arctic.
However,  some  specific  issues  can  make  CIs  in  the  Arctic  area  more
vulnerable, most notably the long distances and harsh winter conditions. In
general, the overall strategy of Svalbard is to identify the bottlenecks and
locate and enhance redundant systems to overcome natural, technological
and man-made threats.
Norway is a relevant case study area because of its focus on information
security,  protective  security,  vulnerabilities  and  locations  of  critical
information  systems equipment  and  their  relation  to  weather  conditions.
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Norway can be used as a model for designing a legal framework to protect
CIs in the energy sector against cyberthreats and as a source of inspiration
for the drafting of future agreements in the Arctic and in the EHN area
because it  combines sources of law and policy in an integrative manner.
This  also  demonstrates  that  the  applicability  of  international  law  and
regional  law  dealing  with  cyberthreats  to  CIs  cannot  be  isolated  from
domestic  and  local  dimensions.  Interaction  between  different  levels  of
governance is a must. 
What is particularly interesting about the Norwegian case study is the how
the country conducts risk assessments and focuses on information security.
Norwegian law includes sections on identification and sensitive information
(information that  might  damage installations or  affect  the power  supply,
such as vulnerabilities or location; Cassotta et al., 2019). The Norwegian
approach is based on four principles that are relevant for this analysis: 1) the
responsibility principle, which implies that an agency that is responsible for
a  sector  or  an  issue  under  normal  circumstances  is  also  responsible  for
handling extraordinary events; 2) the equality principle, which states that
the normal daily organisation structure should be maintained (as much as
possible) during extraordinary events; 3) the subsidiarity principle, which
explains  that  extraordinary  events  should be  handled  at  a  lower  level  if
possible; and 4) the cooperation principle, wherein each authority, function
or  agency  must  take  responsibility  for  organising  the  best  possible
cooperation with all relevant actors for the prevention of, preparedness for
and response to extraordinary events.
The  Norwegian  approach  also  includes  a  specific  and  inspiring
cybersecurity response framework. All these mentioned components of the
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Norwegian model are lacking in other regional levels, such as at the EU and
international levels. According to the Norwegian perspective, even though it
could be argued that  the  Arctic  is  much less  critical  in  terms  of  danger
exposure  to  cyber  threats  due  to  its  smaller  population,  there  is  less
redundancy and longer distances in some areas at times cold weather that
can justify this concept. While the consequences may be small in terms of
the number of victims, they can be enormous in terms of severity. 
The existence of ECICs is also supported by the cascading effects of CIs
and general climatic cascading effects, which are not linked to cybersecurity
and  CIs  but  rather  to  the  peculiar  geographical  location  of  the  Arctic
(Intergovernmental  Panel on Climate Change, 2017).  The authors  of this
study  have  advocated  that  these  two  types  of  cascading  effects  act
cumulatively and interact. 
The first cascading effect of CIs explains that increasing dependencies on
CIs could trigger cascading failures and multi-sectorial collapse (Van Eeten,
2011).  This cascading effect  belongs to the category of  events  with low
probability  and  high  consequence.  The  potential  of  a  domino  effect  is
undeniable. Organisational and state involvement is not clear or easy, and
states do not actually know how to deal with cascading effects (Van Eeten,
2011).
The second cascading effect of CIs is defined in this research as the climatic
cascading effect of the Arctic. According to this condition of the climatic
cascading effect, the Arctic is the thermic regulator for the entire planet, and
thus events  that  occur  there  will  not  remain isolated  to  that  region.  For
example, if an oil spill or nuclear explosion were to occur in this region, it
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would have enormous repercussions for the rest of the planet (Cassotta &
Goodsite, 2013). This is enough to justify the need for extraordinary legal
and political measures to protect CIs in the Arctic.
The impact of this second cascading effect could not only affect the cultural
heritage of the indigenous rural populations in this area, thus contributing to
jeopardising  their  survival  and  leading  to  their  extinction,  but  also  the
extinction of humankind in the rest of the world due to the critical position
of the Arctic. This is why environmental governance and cybersecurity for
CIs  in  the  energy  sector  within  the  Arctic  EHN must  be  linked  to  and
incorporated with the concept of human security (Cassotta et al., 2019).
In  the  EHN  region,  the  procurement  of  natural  resources  is  being
increasingly managed through cyber control. Outlining the identification of
a possible regulatory framework for this technology is important not only in
terms of  national  legislation but also in  view of this  local,  regional  and
international network.
An examination of the laws governing cyberthreats to CIs under ECICs is
also  important  for  practical  experts  and  policymakers  in  the  field  of
international security by contributing to the concept of human security. This
research has therefore mapped the legal and political framework protecting
CIs in the EHN using Norway as a case study because this country is highly
dependent on both cyber technology and CIs, such as offshore industries.
Digitalised offshore activities are very relevant in Norway since this country
is  highly  dependent  on  these  operations,  especially  transportation,
aquaculture and fish farming.
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At the regional level, EU law provides significant potential for covering and
protecting  CIs  in  the  EHN,  denoting  the  existence  of  a  complex
cybersecurity  regime  that  is  not  yet  consolidated.  However,  from  this
analysis, it can be deduced that the current cybersecurity regime, including
issues of cyberthreats and cyberattacks to CIs under ECICs in the EHN, is
not yet a consolidated regime but rather a complex process that requires
further development. The mapping of related legal and political frameworks
in this research has helped to establish a foundation for how a framework
against  cyberthreats  and  cyberattacks  to  CIs  under  ECICs  in  the  EHN
should be developed through combining different levels of governance.
This therefore leads to the following research question: based on a human
security focus, in the case of cyberthreats to CIs under ECICs in the EHN,
what recommendations can be made to improve international and regional
laws? Thus, not only does an analytical overview of the many international
accords  operating  in  different  areas  of  law  need  to  be  undertaken,  but
domestic mechanisms must also be considered. Hence, our study shows that
it is possible to use a human security focus in the case of cyberthreats to CIs
under ECICs in the EHN, and it details how such an assessment can provide
recommendations  to  improve  international  and  regional  law.  In  order  to
assess the possibility of refitting existing legal and non-legal instruments to
fill the gap in international and regional law as well as address the research
questions of the study, this research has formulated two main assumptions.
The first assumption is that the Norwegian model could represent a legal
and  policy  framework  to  improve  the  applicability  of  international  and
regional law for designing proactive legal mechanisms to achieve human
security goals in a pluralistic context.  The second assumption is that  the
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Norwegian model  should be combined with a  pluralistic  and polycentric
patchwork  of  governance  –  such  as  standards,  strategic  tools,  risk
assessment approaches and a backdrop of cooperation and coordination at
the geopolitical level – in order to enhance the applicability of international
and regional law.
The issue of cyberattacks to CIs under ECICs in the EHN is supported in
this  chapter  by  a  discussion  of  scientific  publications  coauthored  with
specialists in these sectors (CIs and energy infrastructures), which provides
an opportunity to expand the notion of human security. However, the issue
of possible cyber-attacks to CIs exposed to environmental threats could also
be  perceived  negatively  as  a  disrupter  to  Arctic  collaboration  and
coordination. This leads to the question of how this coordination can be
reconciled with the activities of relevant international organisations, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. It is important
to remember that two of the EHN countries, Finland and Sweden, are not
part of NATO, and Norway is not a member of the EU (although it is a
member of  the European Economic Agreement  and thus covered by EU
legislation on cybersecurity).
The  role  of  NATO  is  particularly  interesting  compared  to  other  Arctic
regional institutions with non-existent  or weak roles  in the enactment of
legislation. These regional institutions (such as the Arctic Council, Barents
Europe Arctic Council, Barents Regional Council and Nordic Council  of
Ministers) cannot competently deal with cybersecurity or security issues,
nor can they govern the nexus between environmental governance, CIs, the
energy sector and cybersecurity under ECICs. More important is that NATO
is the only institution (compared to the other existing Arctic institutions)
101
that is dealing with the linkage between environmental governance, climate
change and cybersecurity under ECICs through international cooperation.
For example, one of these responses is to achieve resilience. In this context,
approaches to risk assessment and resilience in the EHN (as defined by both
civilian and military agencies) focus on system resilience, which is required
for unknown and hybrid threats (Cassotta et al., 2019). According to NATO
(2016), resilience and increased civil-military readiness are recognised as
key  goals  for  dealing  with  threats  to  digitalised  CIs,  including
anthropogenic  (cyberattacks)  and  environmental  (space  weather  or  other
extreme weather events linked to climate change) threats.
 5.4 Conclusion
Currently,  at  the international,  EU and national  levels,  there is  a lack of
uniformity in the laws protecting CIs. There is no regional or even global
approach in terms of  human security.  However,  a theoretical,  applicable,
regulatory framework could be applied. 
It  is  found  that  existing  international  legal  frameworks  do  not  directly
address cyberattacks because they were formed prior to the emergence of
cyberspace, but they could still be used in the instance of such attacks. A
satisfactory  regulatory  framework  integrating  law  and  policy  should  be
uniform and  homogeneous  and  should  include  the  possibility  to  govern
freedom from risks in order to design a law based on a precautionary and
proactive rather than reactive approach. 
In  terms  of  governance,  such  a  framework  should  not  be  based  on  a
monistic  vision  of  the  sources  of  law  but  rather  on  a  pluralistic  and
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polycentric vision, wherein sources of law and policy from both the public
and  private  sector  overlap  and  coexist.  Thus,  law  and  policy  utilising
different tools (such as standards, soft law and technical expertise) would
coexist in a patchwork mix of instruments. 
CIs under ECICs represent a crucial  empirical opportunity to understand
how to strategically design a patchwork palimpsest composed of a mix of
different regulatory pluralistic instruments that will aid policy makers. The
policy  design  should  include  freedom from hazards,  freedom  from  fear
(addressing the conflict of a humanitarian agenda), freedom from want (in
the context of a human development agenda) and freedom of dignity (with
reference to human rights, the rule of law and good/effective governance).
In light of this pluralistic and polycentric perspective, this study examined
the  interactions,  pros  and  cons  of  different  categories  of  regulatory
instrument  mixes.  This  study  emphasised  that  in  the  context  of  cyber-
realpolitik,  this mix of instruments  is  connected to collateral  governance
issues, such as environmental climate threats, international relations, public
and private approaches to human security and standards. 
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 6 Conclusions
Gerald Zojer
Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
Digitalisation is rapidly changing our societies, and the relatively peripheral
areas of northernmost Finland, Norway and Sweden – the European High
North (EHN) – have likewise been affected. This region is the homeland of
the Sámi,  an  Indigenous  people  with several  languages.  For  the EHN  –
which  is  sparsely  populated,  has  a  less  developed  infrastructure  (health
services, information and communication technologies [ICTs], etc.) than in
the more southern parts of these countries and which is characterised by a
harsh climate  – digitalisation offers numerous benefits. As a result of the
digitalisation  policies  of  the  EHN  countries,  digitalisation  is  already
relatively advanced. The motif for advancing digital technologies and ICTs
is to increase efficiency of existing services and activities and to promote
(new)  business  opportunities.  However,  digitalisation  also  creates  new
challenges  to  people’s  everyday  lives.  While  some  of  the  enabling  and
constraining effects of digitalisation are similar to those in other regions, the
peculiarities  of  the EHN also lead  to  a  distinct  set  of  opportunities  and
challenges.
For instance, digitalisation of public services can reduce time and resources
spent on travel by making services available in remote places. However, this
is often accompanied by cutbacks to physical services.  Digitalisation can
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allow people to live, study and work in peripheral areas such as the EHN.
However, not everyone wants, can access or is able to use ICTs as required
in  order  benefit  from  digital  (public)  services.  Thus,  digitalisation  may
create new insecurities or exclusion for some people. ICTs and cyberspace
also affect citizens and civil society organisations. The adoption of these
technologies has led to instrumental changes in how non-governmental and
non-profit organisations operate. Yet, the emergence of cyberspace has both
enhancing  and  constraining  effects,  and  the  use  of  cyberspace  has  not
profoundly  altered  the  terms  of  the  relative  power  of  one  type  of  civil
society over another. In other words, digitalisation neither democratises nor
undemocratises  societies.  Digital  technologies  not  only  play  an  ever-
increasing role in  public administration and personal life,  but  other  core
infrastructures also depend heavily on ICTs, such as water or energy supply.
The EHN climatic  conditions  as  well  as  human-induced  climate  change
pose  risks  to  these  infrastructures  and  cybersecurity.  Uninterrupted
operation of these infrastructures is necessary for human wellbeing.
Digitalisation in the EHN states has been pushed by national and regional
policies, and the rapid adoption of digital technologies and ICTs has made
societies  more  dependent  on  the  uninterrupted  supply  of  these  services.
However,  ICTs  are  vulnerable,  and  their  operation  is  challenged  by
connectivity problems, technical  malfunctions, human abuse and error as
well  as  hostile  interests.  Consequently,  information  security  and
cybersecurity frameworks have been established in order to address these
challenges. When the ICT infrastructure of an entire state is challenged, the
question of security is  shifted to the national  level.  The countries of the
EHN have endorsed cybersecurity strategies to address such threats. Their
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aim is  to  protect  critical  infrastructure  from adverse  events.  Indeed,  the
reliability of these infrastructures has become important for the functioning
of contemporary societies. However, in the end these technologies should
serve  a  prospering  development  of  humankind.  Thus,  the  aim  of
cybersecurity must first be to safeguard human wellbeing in a digitalising
world. Mainstream cybersecurity approaches, however, fail to address the
negative  impacts  of  digitalisation,  as  these  approaches  are  somewhat
techno-determinist, assuming that digital technologies benefit society and
that safeguarding their functioning automatically serves societal wellbeing.
However,  such  an  understanding  fails  to  acknowledge that  digitalisation
contains both enabling and constraining effects. Mainstream cybersecurity
understanding falls short of addressing challenges and threats that people
experience in their everyday lives and that originate from the dispersion of
digital technologies. Therefore, cybersecurity needs to be conceptualised in
a  more  comprehensive  manner  that  includes  the  societal  impacts  of
cyberspace, ICTs and digitalisation and that also considers its effects at the
individual and sub-state community levels.
The results of the Enablement besides Constraints: Human Security and a
Cyber  Multi-Disciplinary  Framework  in  the  European  High  North
(ECoHuCy) research project, which are summarised in this synthesis report,
show  that  integrating  a  human  security  approach  can  be  inclusive  to
traditional  cybersecurity  concerns  and  the  everyday  life  experiences  of
people in their region-specific context.  This human-centred cybersecurity
approach shifts the human into the focus of security concerns and considers
both  the  enabling  and  constraining  effects  of  digitalisation.  This
comprehensive cybersecurity framework can be applied as a tool in order to
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create meaningful and targeted policies that address both the positive and
negative  impacts  of  digitalisation  while  at  the  same  time  having  the
flexibility to consider regional peculiarities.
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